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Abstract: The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic has led to acute supply shortages 
across the country as well as concerns over price increases amid surging demand. 
In the process, it has reawakened a debate about whether and how to regulate 
“price gouging.” Animating this controversy is a longstanding conflict between 
laissez-faire economics (which champions price fluctuations as a means to allocate 
scarce goods) and perceived norms of consumer fairness (which are thought to cut 
strongly against sharp price hikes amid shortages). This article provides a new, 
empirically grounded perspective on the price gouging debate that challenges 
several aspects of conventional wisdom. We report results from a survey 
experiment administered to a large, nationally representative sample during the 
height of the pandemic’s initial wave. We presented participants with a variety of 
vignettes involving price increases, eliciting their reactions along two dimensions: 
the degree of unfairness they perceived, and the legal response they favored. 
Overall, we find that participants are more tolerant of price increases than either 
the existing behavioral economics literature predicts or most state price gouging 
statutes countenance. But we also find that price fairness perceptions can be highly 
sensitive to context. For example, participants are much more tolerant of moderate 
price increases if they previously are asked to contemplate large price increases. 
Moreover, participants are substantially more willing to accept a price increase 
when it is accompanied by an apology and/or a public-minded rationale (such as 
supporting furloughed employees). We explore the implications of our findings for 
behavioral economics, pricing practices, and legal reform. 
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The outbreak of Covid-19 across the United States in the spring of 2020 quickly led to 
shortages of several consumer products on store shelves, due to both supply chain disruptions and 
hoarding by purchasers.1 Sellers frequently responded by raising prices, imposing quantity 
limitations, and, in some cases, auctioning off items to the highest bidder.2 In turn, those responses 
triggered complaints from consumers and spurred law enforcement officials to initiate hundreds of 
actions against sellers for alleged violations of state and local price gouging laws.3 
  
Although the Covid-19 crisis is, well, novel from an epidemiological perspective, 
controversies over price gouging are anything but. Laws limiting price markups date back several 
millennia,4 and one need not look hard to find several notorious episodes of price gouging in the 
United States amid emergency-related shortages, including the Spanish influenza outbreak of 
1918-19,5 both world wars,6 the Cuban missile crisis,7 and the “Y2K” computer bug in late 1999.8  
More recently, concerns over price gouging surged in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
and Hurricane Harvey in 2017.9  
 
 
1 See generally Dmitry Ivanov, Predicting the Impacts of Epidemic Outbreaks on Global Supply Chains: A Simulation-Based 
Analysis on the Coronavirus Outbreak (COVID-19/SARS-CoV-2) Case, 136 Transp. Res. Part E: Logistics & Transp. 
Rev. 1 (2020), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1366554520304300; Ana Swanson, Global 
Trade Sputters, Leaving Too Much Here, Too Little There, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2020,  
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/business/economy/global-trade-shortages-coronavirus.html; Brad 
Brooks & Andrew Hay, Hoarding In The USA? Coronavirus Sparks Consumer Concern, Reuters, Feb. 28, 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-usa-hoarding/hoarding-in-the-usa-coronavirus-sparks-
consumer-concerns-idUSKCN20M37V. 
2 See, e.g., CBS, Texas firm accused of price-gouging by auctioning 750,000 medical masks, CBS News March 27, 2020, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/texas-medical-face-masks-auctioneer-suing-coronavirus/. 
3 See, e.g., Lexology, Price Gouging: AG Enforcement Actions and Investigations on the Rise (July 13, 2020), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b1142ece-1c15-4783-88f7-e71dc5107a13. At present, 
federal law plays a minimal role in regulating price gouging practices. See, e.g., Annie Palmer, Top Amazon Exec 
Calls for Federal Price Gouging Law Amid Coronavirus Scams, CNBC, May 13, 2020,  
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/13/top-amazon-exec-calls-for-federal-price-gouging-law-amid-coronavirus-
scams.html. 
4 See Hershey H. Friedman, Biblical Foundations of Business Ethics, 43 J. Mkts. & Morality 43 (Spring, 2000). 
5 Christina M. Stetler, The 1918 Spanish Influenza: Three Months of Horror in Philadelphia, 84 Pa. Hist.: J. Mid-Atlantic 
Stud. 462 (2017). 
6 Hugh Rockoff, Drastic Measures: A History of Wage and Price Controls in the United States, Cambridge U. Press (1984); 
Robert Higgs, The Two-Price System: U.S. Rationing During World War II, Found. For Econ. Educ. (Apr. 24, 2009), 
https://fee.org/articles/the-two-price-system-us-rationing-during-world-war-ii/. 
7 Tom Wicker, A Lesson of Crisis, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1989, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/31/opinion/in-the-nation-a-lesson-of-crisis.html. 
8 Robin Fields, L.A. Agency Watches Y2K Schemes, L.A. Times, July 15, 1999, 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-jul-15-fi-56206-story.html. 
9 See price gouging, Google Trends, 
https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=US&q=price%20gouging (last visited May 6, 2020). 













Much of the concern over price gouging appears rooted in a perception that certain types 
of price hikes during an emergency are simply “unfair.”10 A growing empirical literature seeks to 
understand when and why such societal norms regarding price fairness emerge. By far the most 
influential work in the price gouging canon is a 1986 article by Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, 
and Richard Thaler (KK&T),11 two of whom (Kahneman and Thaler) went on to win Nobel Prizes 
for that and related research.12 In their study, KK&T report results from telephone surveys of 
residents of two Canadian metropolitan areas, Toronto and Vancouver, who were interviewed 
regarding their perceptions of various pricing practices during hypothetical shortages.13 The 
authors found that respondents in their sample generally considered it unfair for stores to raise 
prices due to a surge in demand or a sudden shortage, though consumers looked more favorably 
upon price hikes that were linked to increases in supplier costs.14 Based on their findings, KK&T 
conjectured that fairness norms may subvert standard supply-and-demand intuitions, with sellers 
refraining from marking up prices during shortages for fear of inviting consumer backlash.15 
  
The Covid-19 pandemic presents a unique opportunity to revisit the price gouging 
literature amid a real and palpable crisis. Our project is partly one of replication: we seek to test 
whether U.S. consumers confronted with salient and immediate shortages caused by Covid-19 
display the same fairness intuitions as Canadian consumers surveyed by KK&T under very 
different circumstances over three-and-a-half decades ago. Replication analysis is critically 
important to the collective research enterprise,16 and one of our contributions is to evaluate the 
robustness of existing results.  
 
But our ambition goes beyond replication in several ways. First, we situate the empirical 
literature on consumer fairness perceptions within several overlapping policy frameworks for 
understanding price gouging laws. More specifically, we explore when, why, and how fairness 
perceptions may justify and inform the design of price gouging statutes. Second, we attempt to 
 
10 See, e.g., Jeremy Snyder, What's the Matter with Price Gouging?, 19 Bus. Ethics Q. 275 (2009) (reviewing literature 
and developing a moral account of price gouging prohibition based on an account of fairness that highlights 
mutual respect); Emily Raymond, Want to Be a Hollywood Villain? Try Hoarding During the Pandemic, Wash. Post, 
Mar. 18, 2020,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/03/18/want-be-hollywood-villain-try-
hoarding-during-pandemic/. We note that while this norm appears broadly held, others have questioned 
whether gouging is morally objectionable and/or whether it should be prohibited. See, e.g., Matt Zwolinski, The 
Ethics of Price Gouging, 18 Bus. Ethics Q. 347 (2008). 
11 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the 
Market, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 728 (1986). 
12 See Deborah Smith, Psychologist Wins Nobel Prize, 33 Am. Psychol. Ass’n 22 (2002), 
https://www.apa.org/monitor/dec02/nobel.html; John Cassidy, The Making of Richard Thaler’s Economics Nobel, 
The New Yorker, Oct. 10, 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-making-of-richard-
thalers-economics-nobel. 
13 See Kahneman et al., supra note 11, at 729.  
14 See id. at 738-740. 
15 Or, in the authors’ words, “the market will fail to clear in the short run.” Id. at 738. 
16 See generally Gary King, Replication, Replication, 28 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 444 (1995) (emphasizing the importance 
of replication studies). 













benchmark our respondents’ views against existing laws on the books related to price gouging 
across the United States, asking whether the contours of such laws comport with the public’s 
fairness intuitions. Our results are thus directly relevant to the study of consumer protection laws 
at the federal, state, and local levels. Third, we extend the existing empirical literature by evaluating 
an expanded range of factors that potentially shape price-fairness perceptions. We seek to 
determine whether consumers are more sensitive to the relative or absolute magnitude of price 
increases, whether increases in prices for necessities generate different reactions than increases in 
prices for luxury goods, whether merchants can reframe price increases in ways that make 
consumers more accepting of those changes, and whether consumers may be amenable to 
alternative allocation mechanisms such as rationing and auctions during an emergency.  
 
To gain purchase on the questions above, we conducted two survey experiments using a 
large, nationally representative sample of U.S. adults. Our surveys were administered during the 
late spring of 2020, just as Covid-19-related shortages were rippling across the country. We report 
the results of those surveys and supplement their results with an analysis of the price gouging laws 
of all 50 states and the District of Columbia, highlighting areas in which consumer fairness 
perceptions conform to and diverge from legal prescriptions. We then consider the implications of 
our findings for social and behavioral scientists, market participants, and legal policymakers. 
 
Overall, our participants demonstrated substantially greater willingness to accept price 
increases in a shortage than conventional wisdom predicts. For example, KK&T presented 
Canadian consumers with a scenario in which a hardware store raised the price of snow shovels 
from $15 to $20 after a large snowstorm; they report that more than four-fifths of respondents (82 
percent) characterized the price increase as unfair.17 When we presented our U.S. survey 
participants with a scenario in which a supermarket raised the price of a bottle of hand sanitizer 
after the onset of Covid-19 by the same relative magnitude as the price increase in the KK&T 
study, fewer than half deemed the price increase to be unfair. Notably, our results remained 
broadly the same when we changed the item in question from hand sanitizer (a necessity in the 
context of a droplet-borne infection) to potato chips (an item much harder to characterize as 
necessary18), and when we manipulated price and quantity for bulk purchases of hand sanitizer at 
higher sticker prices. Perhaps even more strikingly, roughly the same fraction (less than half of all 
respondents) considered a $15-to-$20 price increase to be unfair when we presented them with the 
identical question regarding snow shovels used in KK&T.19 
  
 
17 See Kahneman et al., supra note 11, at 729. 
18 By way of example, at least two out of the three coauthors on this paper do not view potato chips as a necessity. 
19 As explained below, a portion of the divergence between our results and KK&T’s may be attributable to 
“order effects,” whereby subjects in our study became more permissive of certain moderate price increases after 
having first been exposed to an extreme price hike. This interaction further underscores the apparent 
contingency of manifest consumer fairness perceptions, and the challenges that attend legal policy making in the 
face of such contingencies. See infra Parts III.B.4 and IV. 














We then go on to explore a wider range of conditions affecting consumer perceptions of 
price fairness in an emergency. Of particular note, we find that when consumers are informed that 
extra revenues from a price increase will be used to provide paid leave for workers, the share who 
consider the price increase to be unfair falls dramatically, to less than one-fifth. This finding is 
especially important because it suggests conditions under which price increases can play a role in 
allocating scarce resources during a shortage without triggering a strong backlash from purchasers. 
It also underscores the influence of factors beyond dollar amounts and percentages on consumer 
perceptions of price fairness. 
 
We also investigate consumer reactions to two alternative allocative mechanisms: quantity 
rationing and auctioning. The existing empirical literature on consumer attitudes toward rationing 
and auctioning is inconclusive, though some studies suggest resistance to rationing20 and 
acceptance of auctioning.21 Our results on both scores are unambiguous: consumers are broadly 
willing to accept voluntary rationing, but they bristle at auctioning. Indeed, nearly all respondents 
(97%) considered rationing (e.g., a rule of one bottle of hand sanitizer per customer) to be fair, 
while less than one-fifth thought it was fair for a store to allocate scarce items through an auction. 
This finding may help explain the widespread voluntary use of quantity limits amid shortages 
notwithstanding what economists understand to be the undesirable and potentially perverse 
allocative consequences of such limits.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, we find that consumers do not––on the whole––
think that price increases of the magnitudes contemplated by the prior empirical literature ought 
to trigger punishment. When asked how they believe authorities ought to respond to a supermarket 
that raises the price of hand sanitizer by 33% after the onset of the Covid-19 crisis, approximately 
three-fifths of respondents said the government should do “nothing.” When told that profits from 
hand sanitizer sales would be used to provide paid leave to workers, support for the do-nothing 
response to the same magnitude price change increased to nearly four out of five. This finding is 
particularly striking given that, in many states, a price increase of that magnitude in an emergency 
(whether justified or not by a plan to enhance worker benefits) would be prima facie illegal and in 
many cases punishable as a misdemeanor.  
 
Our findings have important implications for both behavioral economics and consumer 
law. As to the former, our results highlight the fluidity and contingency of fairness perceptions. 
Canadian consumers circa 1985 and U.S. consumers circa 2020 appear to differ meaningfully in 
 
20 See Robert J. Shiller, Maxim Boycko & Vladimir Korobov, Popular Attitudes Toward Free Markets: The Soviet Union 
and the United States Compared, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 386, 388-90 (1991); John G. Marcis, Alan B. Deck, Daniel L. 
Bauer & Vicki King-Skinner, A Study of Students’ Views of Market Fairness, 15 J. Econ. & Econ. Educ. Res. no. 2, at 
25, 31 tbl.1 (2014). We discuss both studies in further detail in Section I.C.  
21 See Howard Kunreuther, Comments on Plott and on Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 59 J. Bus. S329, S331 (1986); 
Yue Gao, A Study of Fairness Judgments in China, Switzerland and Canada: Do Culture, Being a Student, and Gender Matter?, 
4 Judgment & Decision Making 214, 222 tbl.8 (2009). 













their reactions to price increases. This finding underscores the importance of updating and 
replicating canonical results in the consumer fairness literature specifically, and the behavioral 
economics literature more generally, before drawing strong generalizations (or at least periodically 
revisiting those results). As for consumer law, our findings suggest that price gouging statutes in 
many U.S. states tend to diverge from shared fairness intuitions among U.S. adults, sometimes 
appreciably.22 This disconnect is not only interesting in its own right, but it bears on the question 
of whether prevailing laws actually serve their intended purpose(s).23 
 
The remainder of this article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the motivation for the 
study. Part II details the design and data collection approach. Part III presents and analyzes results. 
Part IV considers implications for legal reform, behavioral economics, and private ordering. Two 
appendices provide greater detail about (a) existing price gouging laws across the United States; 
and (b) the statistical robustness of our core results. 
 
I.  Understanding Price Gouging 
 
A core challenge in studying price gouging is its Rorschach-test-like nature24: it lends itself 
to multiple, often unarticulated, normative accounts of what it is, why it’s wrong, and what the 
core “goals” of price gouging laws are (or should be). Accordingly, we consider several such 
accounts in Section I.A below; but in doing so, we aspire neither to canvass all plausible normative 
theories nor to endorse a favorite. Rather, our aim is to demonstrate that several of the most 
plausible accounts turn—sometimes centrally—on the content and contours of societal fairness 
perceptions. Consequently, whichever of these policy rationales ultimately undergirds price 
gouging laws, our empirical inquiry and results are directly pertinent. In Section I.B, we discuss 
the specific role that consumer fairness perceptions play in understanding and interpreting existing 
price gouging laws. In Section I.C, we provide an overview of the extant empirical literature on 
consumer perceptions of price fairness, and we explain how this study contributes to that body of 
research. 
 
A. Normative Accounts of Price Gouging Laws 
 
Standard neoclassical economics provides a helpful starting point for thinking about 
normative justifications for price gouging laws. According to this view, any constraints on price 
 
22 For example, our participants tend not to distinguish between merchants and opportunistic residents who 
gouge, or between gouging as necessities or non-necessities (while most price gouging statutes do). To the extent 
price gouging laws should reflect folk norms of fairness in market settings, the divergence between such statutes 
and our results would be cause for concern. For a more detailed exploration of these implications, Part IV, infra. 
23 As we show below, the disconnect between consumer perceptions and prevailing laws is noteworthy under 
several different alternative normative justifications for price gouging laws. See Parts I and IV, infra. 
24 See, e.g., Constantine von Hoffman, After Sandy, Allegations of Price Gouging, CBS News, Nov. 2, 2012, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/after-sandy-allegations-of-price-gouging (“[P]rice gouging, like beauty, is in 
the eye of the beholder.”). 














movements are presumptively undesirable, since sellers who raise prices in a shortage (or reduce 
them amid surplus) advance three desirable social ends. First, market price plays a welfare-
enhancing rationing role, ensuring that goods in short supply go to those most willing to pay for 
them. Second, price changes can send effective public signals about scarcity to economic agents 
and policymakers, relieving them of having to conduct costly reconnaissance on consumer tastes, 
supply chain disruptions, or input availability.25 Finally, the profit-making opportunities that rising 
prices enable can induce suppliers to ramp up production and/or enter the market, ultimately 
dampening the shortages in question.26 According to the neoclassical account, then, price gouging 
prohibitions interfere with these equilibrating market forces, and by so doing leave us collectively 
worse off.27 
 
Skeptics of this unalloyed neoclassical account (ourselves included) would likely rejoin that 
notwithstanding the usually beneficial role of the price mechanism, several factors can call into 
question whether equilibrium market prices give rise to desirable social allocations, particularly at 
moments of economic uncertainty and crisis. We consider several such arguments below, relating 
to distributional concerns, civic virtue and social cohesion, negative externalities, and bounded 
rationality and information. 
 
1. Distributional Concerns 
 
One potential defense of laws prohibiting price gouging is that such behavior visits 
intolerable harms on vulnerable groups—and in particular, poor and low-income consumers.28 
The neoclassical account, this argument goes, hinges critically on the assumption that someone’s 
“willingness to pay” for a good or service roughly aligns with the social value created when the 
item is allocated to them. However, people who are poor and/or facing liquidity constraints may 
simply be unable to pay their true hedonic valuations.29 And while the disconnect between 
willingness and ability to pay is a general phenomenon, it can become most stark (perhaps even 
fatal) during moments of public emergency, when prices for life-saving necessities may escalate to 
a level that only the well-heeled can afford. Constraining price run-ups, then, may be one way to 




25 See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937); K. J. Arrow, An Extension of the Basic 
Theorems of Welfare Economics, in Proc. of the Second Berkeley Symposium 507 (J. Neyman, ed. 1951); Leonid 
Hurwicz, The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation, 63 Am. Econ. Rev.: Papers & Proc. 1 (1973) (reviewing 
literature). 
26 Michael Brewer, Planning Disaster: Price Gouging Statutes and the Shortages They Create, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 1101 (2007). 
27 For one recent statement of the neoclassical view, see David Schmidtz, Are Price Controls Fair?, 23 Sup. Ct. Econ. 
Rev. 221 (2016). 
28 See Snyder, supra note 10.   
29 John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 
Duke L. J. 1603 (2013) (discussing divergences between willingness-to-pay and welfare). 














It is important to note that the distributional argument articulated above is largely a 
negative argument against markets, rather than a positive argument for any particular alternative. 
It does not reveal which (if any) other approach to allocation fares better. And here, the “compared 
to what?” question can loom large: As the philosopher Matt Zwolinski notes, “[a]ll our distributive 
options are imperfect” in a shortage.30 For example, allocation on a first-come, first-served basis–
–with prices remaining low––may disadvantage older and disabled individuals who cannot make 
it to the store immediately, as well as lower-wage workers who do not have the luxury of taking off 
time to purchase necessities. Similarly, quantity rationing rules (e.g., “one package of toilet paper 
per customer”) may fail to account for the differential needs of larger families, irritable-bowel-
syndrome sufferers, and so on. Lower-income individuals are likely losers from price gouging, but 
they could also be losers under various alternatives to price gouging as well. 
 
Policy concerns over distributional outcomes also prove to be an awkward fit for many 
existing price gouging statutes, which limit price increases in an emergency but do not prohibit 
high prices per se. Under California’s price gouging statute, for example, if Walmart initially sold 
hand sanitizer for $3 before a declared state emergency, it could not legally raise the price to $4 in 
the 30 days after the emergency declaration.31 However, if 7-Eleven sold the same bottle of hand 
sanitizer for $5 pre-emergency, it could continue to sell the product for $5 after the declaration. If 
one’s normative goal is to ensure that low-income individuals have access to essential goods and 
services at affordable prices, California’s statute appears underinclusive. It is also (at least arguably) 
over-inclusive, since it penalizes sellers who previously offered goods and services at heavily 
discounted prices during times of surplus (thereby expanding access) and then ended those 
discounts in an emergency. 
 
None of this is to suggest that distributional concerns are irrelevant to the price gouging 
debate—to the contrary, they are (in our view) central to it. What it does suggest, however, is that 
a robust defense of existing price gouging statutes may have to look beyond distributional concerns 
alone. The remainder of this Section considers alternative approaches to price gouging and 





A second potential normative framework for evaluating price gouging approaches the issue 
from the standpoint of communitarian theories of justice. Consider, for example, the following 
view articulated by the philosopher Michael Sandel: 
 
 
30 Zwolinski, supra note 10, at 362. 
31 See Cal. Penal Code § 396 (West 2020). Any price increase greater than 10 percent would be a prima facie 
violation of the California statute. 













In times of trouble, a good society pulls together. Rather than press for maximum 
advantage, people look out for one another. A society in which people exploit their 
neighbors for financial gain in times of crisis is not a good society. Excessive greed 
is therefore a vice that a good society should discourage if it can. Price-gouging laws 
cannot banish greed, but they can at least restrain its most brazen expression, and 
signal society’s disapproval of it. By punishing greedy behavior rather than 
rewarding it, society affirms the civic virtue of shared sacrifice for the common 
good.32 
 
At core, Sandel appears to be making two separate points about price gouging: first, that taking 
financial advantage of one’s neighbors is wrong because it violates shared conceptions of the 
common good; and second, that the law ought to punish such behavior to signal societal 
condemnation.  
 
The first idea—that we are better off when society holds together, and that society holds 
together best when its members adhere to a shared conception of the common good—runs 
throughout communitarian thought and is reflected in communitarian approaches to law.33 Law 
can (and should) assist this effort, the argument goes, by reflecting, supporting, and reinforcing 
these shared community norms. Communitarians acknowledge—indeed, they often emphasize—
that shared norms are historically and culturally contingent. Norms cannot be created from thin 
air nor ascertained deductively. Bowing, kissing, addressing another person by first name, and 
using formal second-person pronouns (such as “usted” or “ustedes” in Spanish) may conform with 
norms in some settings and locales, but not in others. Empirical evidence thus bears on our 
assessment of which pricing practices violate shared norms, potentially justifying regulation.34  
 
Sandel’s second point—that law does and should serve a disapproval-signaling function—
will be even more familiar to many lawyers and legal academics. Expressive theories of law have 
gained considerable traction in recent decades, and the idea that law not only reflects but shapes 
norms is now widely accepted.35 Whether any particular law shapes norms, though, is an empirical 
 
32 Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? 7-8 (2009). 
33 For an introduction to communitarianism and the law, see generally Philip Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian 
Morality, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 445 (1987). 
34 This is not to say that evidence of shared norms supplies the only factor that bears on the communitarian case 
for regulation, though there is a long-running debate—which we cabin for current purposes—on the extent to 
which communitarianism devolves into cultural relativism. Derek Phillips, for example, writes that for Sandel 
and other communitarian theorists, “shared collective values are uncovered from the traditions and practices of 
the group.” Derek L. Phillips, Looking Backward: A Critical Appraisal of Communitarian Thought 13 (1993). 
For an argument that Sandel’s communitarianism allows for a conception of the common good that diverges 
from the traditions and practices of any particular community, see Wanpat Youngmevittaya, A Critical Reflection 
on Michael J. Sandel: Rethinking Communitarianism, 15 J. Soc. Sci., Naresuan Univ. 83 (20190). All would agree, 
though, that shared norms are relative to communitarianism, whether or not determinative. 
35 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 














question. Thus, even if one agrees with Sandel’s argument that the law should be used to signal 
society’s disapproval of price gouging, the question remains: Have laws against price gouging 




A third argument for price gouging laws conjures more directly the language of 
utilitarianism and economics. Under this account, price gouging is undesirable because it imposes 
a negative “aesthetic externality” on third parties who are not directly affected by the price 
increase. That is, individuals may dislike the social existence of price gouging in the same way some 
people dislike the sight of neon green houses. Regardless of whether there is anything intrinsically 
“wrong” with such sensory experiences, the fact remains that some community members dislike 
them and experience disutility when exposed to them. And their disutility is neglected by the 
principal decision makers—producing a negative externality that potentially justifies regulation. A 
suburban zoning board, consequently, might enact an ordinance against neon green houses in the 
interests of improving residents’ welfare regardless of whether the board members themselves do 
or don’t have a taste for neon green.36 In the same vein, a legislature might enact a price gouging 
law simply because a critical fraction of the population shares a distaste for the incidence of price 
gouging as a practice, irrespective of whether they themselves fall prey to it.  
 
The negative-externalities argument for price gouging laws depends directly on empirical 
evidence regarding fairness norms. If consumers do not experience disutility from the fact that 
other consumers are being “gouged,” then there is no negative externality to remedy. To be clear, 
the existence of negative externalities would not make the case for regulation conclusive either; 
policymakers might still decide that externalities are not sufficiently material to justify a legal 
response. But for those who seek to justify price gouging laws on negative-externalities grounds, 
empirical evidence remains a necessary—though not sufficient—ingredient. 
 
4. Consumer Information/Rationality 
 
 A final possible argument in favor of price gouging prohibitions posits that such laws 
address problems that occur when uninformed or boundedly rational consumers participate in 
markets.37 In anticipation of or during crises, some consumers will tend to purchase unfathomably 
 
148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1531-64 (2000); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363 (2000); Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. Legal Stud. 585 (1998). 
36 See, e.g., Joseph P. Kalt, The Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation of Coal Strip Mining, 23 Nat. Resources J. 893 
(1983); Joseph P. Kalt, George C. Galster & Garry W. Hesser, Evaluating and Redesigning Subsidy Policies for Home 
Rehabilitation, 21 Pol’y Sci. 67 (1988); Lee Anne Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in Distributive Justice: The Welfare 
Conundrum, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 235, 269-70. 
37 The concept of bounded rationality was introduced by Herbert Simon: 
Broadly stated, the task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with the kind of rational 
behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the computational capacities that are 













large quantities of certain items (e.g., bottled water, canned soup, and—at least during the Covid-
19 pandemic—hand sanitizer and toilet paper).38 This impulse-hoarding phenomenon is well 
documented in several areas,39 though its implications for price-gouging laws have not been 
thoroughly explored. 
 
 From a neoclassical economic perspective, impulse hoarding could provide an argument 
in favor of allowing market forces to run their course.40 If prices of scarce commodities were 
allowed to fluctuate freely, the argument goes, rising prices might deter impulse buyers from filling 
their basements with bottled water or their bathrooms with surplus toilet paper. And, from a 
psychological perspective, impulse hoarding is not obviously a negative either. For example, by 
allowing consumers to exercise control over uncertain future circumstances, such behavior may 
serve as a useful coping mechanism.41  
 
That said, impulse hoarding can also reveal undesirable dysfunctions in broader market 
dynamics. The danger here may be especially compelling where consumers are relatively 
uninformed about shortages and/or confront highly unfamiliar situations. In the absence of such 
prohibitions, the argument goes, suppliers could take advantage of buyers’ anticipated impulsivity 
by inventorying critical commodities and keeping them off the shelves, only to unload their stocks 
at elevated prices during a crisis. Poorly informed consumers, in turn, may view an initial price 
increase as a signal of looming extended privations, causing them to amplify their hoarding 
activities (ironically enough) because of the initial price increase. Moreover, for novel and unfamiliar 
moments of dislocation, consumers may fall prey to well-documented pathologies of decision 
making under uncertainty, causing them to “over-purchase” items under an assumed worst-case 
scenario.42 Finally, the simple act of hoarding imposes additional costs (such as supply-chain and 
inventory-management pressures) that are undesirable in the absence of delivering real benefits. 
Viewed from this perspective, then, price gouging prohibitions prevent suppliers from 
manipulating pricing, and thus help save impulse buyers “from themselves.” Excess demand and 
supply shortages thus become a feature of price-gouging prohibitions, not a bug.  
 
actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisms 
exist.  
Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man 99 (1957). 
38 On impulsive and compulsive buying around natural disasters, see generally Julie K. Sneath, Russell Lacey & 
Pamela A. Kennett-Hensel, Coping with a Natural Disaster: Losses, Emotions, and Impulsive and Compulsive Buying, 20 
Marketing Letters 45 (2009). 
39 See generally Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias, Columbia Bus. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020); Mark 
J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism - In The Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 Bus. Law. 977 (2013); Daniel M. Gallagher, 
Activism, Short-Termism, and the SEC: Remarks at the 21st Annual Stanford Director’s College, U.S. Sec. and 
Exch. Comm’n (June 23, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/activism-short-termism-and-the-sec.html; 
David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. Econ. 443 (1997).  
40 Keith Sharfman, The Law and Economics of Hoarding, 19 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 179 (2007). 
41 See Julie Z. Sneath, Pamela A. Kennett-Hensel & Russell Lacey, Coping with a Natural Disaster: Losses, Emotions, 
and Impulsive and Compulsive Buying, 20 Marketing Letters 45, 57 (2009). 
42 See, e.g., Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions, 34 Del. J. Corp. L. 755 (2009). 














We remain agnostic (for present purposes) about whether asymmetric information and/or 
bounded rationality are sufficiently severe to overshadow the benefits of market pricing. Rather, 
we merely note (once again) that sophisticated advocates on both sides of the debate may care 
about the social reception of significant price run-ups during shortages. For example, one reason 
why KK&T predicted that prices would not rise sharply in a shortage is that sellers would fear the 
reputational consequences of pricing practices that are widely perceived to be unfair.43 If fairness 
norms operate as an extra-legal deterrent to price gouging, then the need for additional legal 
prohibitions weakens. By contrast, if consumers generally tolerate price increases during shortages, 
then the behavioral-economics case for legal restrictions grows stronger. Once again, this is not the 
only inference that one might draw. As we emphasized above, widespread perceptions that price 
increases are unfair may bolster the case for price gouging laws for several other reasons. What the 
discussion here highlights is our study—and its empirical results—hold relevance for the debate 
about price gouging across several distinct normative theories, even if those theories offer different 
perspectives about how fairness perceptions play into a defense of price gouging prohibitions. 
 
B. Fairness Perceptions and the Content of Price Gouging Laws 
 
 Price gouging controversies do not occur in an institutional vacuum: as noted above, a 
sizable majority of states already have in place statutory proscriptions on price gouging. 
Consequently, even as fairness norms are relevant to the prudent design of price gouging laws, they 
also shed evaluative light on those institutions. Once a state has chosen to restrict various types of 
price increases during moments of crisis, it immediately becomes relevant whether such legal 
regimes “fit” societal mores of fairness. Real-world price gouging laws must make a variety of 
institutional choices that implicate who and what is regulated and how regulations are structured. 
Those contours, moreover, may bear on assessments of societal fairness and legitimacy. For 
example, all jurisdictions with a price gouging law must decide what magnitude of a price increase 
constitutes “gouging.” They also must decide whether all goods will be regulated or only those that 
are necessary for health and safety. They must further choose whether to impose sanctions only on 
merchants (i.e., businesses and individuals who regularly sell the relevant goods for a living) or also 
on occasional sellers (e.g., individuals and opportunists selling items on eBay as a side venture). 
And, they must decide how to punish price-gouging conduct once identified. Because several 
normative theories of lawmaking implicate societal beliefs about legitimate market behavior (as 
illustrated above), our experiments bear on each of these questions.  
 
In this section, we describe several dimensions along which price gouging laws can (and do) 
vary. To facilitate our discussion, we refer readers to Appendix A of this paper, which provides a 
cross-sectional survey of the price gouging laws of all fifty states and the District of Columbia. It 
 
43 See Kahneman et al., supra note 11, at 638. 












reveals a patchwork with appreciable heterogeneity, as different jurisdictions can vary considerably 
in their approach to price gouging.  
 
As noted above, at least three dozen states and the District of Columbia have statutes that 
explicitly make price gouging during any declared state or district emergency unlawful at least for 
certain products and actors.44 By contrast, four states do not explicitly regulate price gouging at all, 
whether by statute, executive order, or some alternative provision.45 Five states have statutes that 
regulate price gouging indirectly, typically through general consumer protection laws that prohibit 
unconscionable, unfair, and/or deceptive business acts (with enforcement discretion normally 
vested in the state’s Attorney General).46 Two states, Maryland and Minnesota, have no price 
gouging statute, but have nevertheless employed executive orders to declare price gouging illegal 
during their Covid-19 emergency declarations.47 Two more states, Nevada and Alaska, have no 
price gouging statute, but permit private parties to file consumer complaints with the Attorney 
General’s office. Delaware’s price gouging prohibition applies only to the Covid-19 emergency and 
a sixty-day recovery period afterwards.48 
 
Of those jurisdictions that have an explicit price gouging statute, there is still substantial 
variation in: (a) the magnitude of price increase that triggers the statute; (b) the constellation of 
goods and services prescribed; (c) the types of sellers subject to regulation; and (d) the magnitude 
of civil and criminal penalties. Although these are not the sole dimensions on which statutes vary, 
they are the most pertinent ones for which people’s fairness intuitions seem most relevant.49 We 
discuss each in turn. 
 
 
44 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Appendix A.  
45 Arizona, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming; See Appendix A; It bears observing price gouging could 
also be proscribed under even more general statutory authority. For example, Washington state has no specific 
statute regarding price gouging, but does have a consumer protection act that prohibits “unfair” trade practices. 
Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.020 (1961). In turn, determining what practices are “unfair” is resolved by courts 
through a process of common law adjudication. Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 204 P.3d 885, 906 (Wash. 
2009). And here, evidence can assist legal observers in predicting case outcomes and, moreover, can help inform 
judges’ conceptualization of fairness. See generally Daniel Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Public Perceptions of 
Government Speech, 2017 Sup. Ct. Rev. 33 (2018) (highlighting the use of survey evidence in judicial decision 
making). 
46 These states include Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Washington. S.B. 6699 (2019-
2020), recently introduced into the Washington state legislature but not enacted, which would prohibit price 
gouging at the time of disaster. An increase in price of more than 10% for certain goods and services would 
become unlawful and subject to a civil fine of no more than $10,000 per violation, cumulative to other remedies. 
See Appendix A.  
47 See Appendix A.   
48 6 Del. Code § 2513A. 
49 See generally Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 45 (highlighting the use of survey evidence in judicial decision 
making). 













 Consider first liability triggers in states that have explicit price gouging statutes. Here, there 
is a significant amount of inter-state variation between precise rule-like criteria and squishier 
standards. Some states (like California) impose hard quantitative thresholds that create prima facie 
liability when a seller increases the price of goods by more than the prescribed percentage relative 
to pre-emergency prices.50 By contrast, other states (like New York) embrace a more flexible legal 
standard: price increases trigger liability if they are (something akin to) “unconscionably 
excessive.”51 These two contrasting approaches illustrate well-known tradeoffs normally associated 
with navigating the rules-standards spectrum. While rules provide certainty and reduce detection 
and enforcement costs, standards promote flexibility, learning, and ex post adjustment.52 Societal 
fairness norms, however, appear relevant for both approaches (as well as hybrids). New York’s 
“unconscionably excessive” standard invokes shared norms about the level at which price increases 
become intolerable.53 And since criminal prosecutions of price gouging will go before juries, lay 
views about price fairness will have important implications for enforcement. Even more 
quantitative triggers like California’s require policymakers to settle in advance on a hard, 
quantitative trigger (be it in percentage or absolute terms). Depending on the normative 
justification for having the statute in the first place, empirical knowledge regarding social norms 
may be relevant to that threshold-setting exercise as well. 
 
 
50 These states include Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Kansas, Mississippi, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. In 
California, the cutoff is 10%. Several other states (and the District of Columbia) similarly use a 10% price increase 
cutoff as prima facie evidence of price gouging, including Arkansas, District of Columbia, New Jersey, Oklahoma, 
Utah, and West Virginia. These cutoffs only create prima facie liability, because virtually all states allow 
defendants to justify price increases if, for example, their own costs went up. See, e.g., Cal Penal Code § 396 (West 
2017); Similarly, Delaware’s Executive Order coronavirus emergency declaration explicitly lists price gouging as 
a violation of state law 6 Del. Code Ann. tit. VI, § 2513 (2018), which can be triggered by strict percentage 
increases of 10% or more for any good or service. Also, Maryland’s Executive Order coronavirus emergency 
declaration explicitly lists price gouging as a violation of state law 2020 Md. Laws ch. 13 & 14, which can be 
triggered by strict percentage increases of 10% or more for any good or service. Yet still, Minnesota’s Emergency 
Executive Order 20-10 issued by Governor Tim Walz on March 20, 2020 declares certain price gouging during 
this emergency “unconscionable,” which can automatically be triggered by a 20% increase for any good or 
service. See Minn. Exec. Order No. 20-10 (Mar. 20, 2020). New Mexico’s Attorney General has released a 
consumer advisory warning following the state’s coronavirus emergency declaration promulgating that any 
increases on the prices of necessities will be prosecuted under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-12-2 (West 2019).  
51 These states include Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 396-r (McKinney 2008); See also 
Minnesota’s Executive Order, supra note 50  (though liability can be automatically triggered by a greater than 20% 
increase in the pricing of essential goods and services, “unconscionably excessive” pricing may also be proven 
with flexible standards, such as a “gross disparity” between the amount charged and the price the good or service 
was available for 30 days preceding the emergency or the price charged exceeds the price at which the same or 
similar goods/services can be obtained in the area; Appendix A (and supporting data from the link therein 
provided). 
52 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L. J. 557 (1992). 
53 N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 396-r (McKinney 2008). 













Price gouging statutes also vary as to whether their proscriptions apply to all goods, or only 
those in specified categories. Nine states and the District of Columbia explicitly apply their price 
gouging laws to all goods, without limitation.54 Others, however, limit their prohibitions to goods 
that are “vital and necessary for the health, safety, and welfare of consumers,” or similar language 
connoting necessity.55 During the Covid-19 pandemic, consumers have experienced price 
increases or shortages for essential health and safety items like masks and hand sanitizer as well as 
less obviously essential goods like Louis Vuitton handbags.56 One contribution of our study is to 
test whether consumers have the same reactions to price gouging for necessities and non-
necessities. 
 
Third, some states apply their price gouging prohibitions only to “merchants” or analogous 
actors in the commercial distribution chain,57 while others regulate anyone who sells (or resells) 
goods. The Uniform Commercial Code—adopted in all fifty states and the District of Columbia—
defines “merchant,” in the main, as “a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his 
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods 
involved in the transaction”58—a definition likely to inform the interpretation of state price gouging 
statutes that invoke the term.59 Although some price gouging enforcement actions amid the Covid-
19 pandemic have aimed at traditional merchants, one of the most salient price gouging 
enforcement actions was against a non-merchant seller who had stockpiled medical gear.60 Our 
study sheds light on whether the merchant/non-merchant distinction, which is inconsistently 
followed by states, tracks widespread fairness intuitions shared by laypeople.  
 
A final pertinent point of statutory variation concerns the types and magnitudes of the legal 
sanctions imposed on those found liable for price gouging violations. Again, states vary markedly 
on this score, and we detail their various choices in Appendix A. Most sanctions can be found by 
cross-reference to states’ consumer protection statutes. Some allow for injunctive relief, some 
enable private rights of action, and most allow for civil fines over a substantial monetary range 
 
54 Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, and 
Oklahoma. 
55 California, Colorado, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Note that 
some states only regulate gas or petroleum prices, including Illinois, Indiana, and Vermont. See Appendix A. 
56 See Annachiara Biondi, Increasing Prices in Covid-19? Chanel, Louis Vuitton Show It Works, Vogue Bus. (Sept. 2, 
2020), https://www.voguebusiness.com/companies/price-increase-china-louis-vuitton-chanel-gucci-covid-19. 
57 States limiting application of their price gouging statute to merchant sellers (or the functional equivalent in the 
supply chain) include: Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin 
[hereinafter Distribution Chain States]. See Appendix A (and supporting data from the link therein provided). 
58 Unif. Comm. Code § 2-104(1) (2001).  
59 See People ex rel. Vacco v. Chazy Hardware, 176 Misc. 2d 960, 963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (applying UCC 
definition of “merchant” under previous version of New York price gouging statute). 
60 See Neil Vigdor, A Hoarder’s Huge Stockpile of Masks and Gloves Will Now Go to Doctors and Nurses, F.B.I. Says, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/nyregion/brooklyn-coronavirus-price-
gouging.html.  












(from a low of $99 to a high of $50,000).61 Finally, ten states allow for the possibility of criminal 
penalties, ranging from misdemeanors to felonies with jail time. This significant degree of variation 
in sanction makes it especially interesting to investigate people’s intuitions about the appropriate 
legal response to price gouging. Although many may find crisis-born price increases to be unfair, 
it need not follow that they believe steep civil fines or criminal penalties to be an appropriate 
response.  
 
C. Price Gouging in the Social and Behavioral Sciences 
 
While a key aspect of our enterprise is to study fairness norms and their implications for 
legal and regulatory policy, our study also engages broader literatures in the social and behavioral 
sciences related to price gouging and consumer fairness perceptions.  
 
First, our study adds to the scholarly understanding of fairness constraints on dynamic 
pricing behavior. This subject was the focus of KK&T’s landmark survey of Canadian consumers, 
and it has been the topic of several follow-on studies. KK&T set out to resolve a puzzle within 
neoclassical economics: Why do we so often observe “sticky” prices and persistent shortages of 
high-demand goods? In the presence of excess demand for a good or service, conventional wisdom 
suggests that prices should rise until the market equilibrates (and vice versa for excess supply). 
Raising the price seems like the simplest and most efficient way to ration, yet that does not always 
happen. Why not? 
 
KK&T posited that consumer fairness perceptions may play an important extra-legal role 
in preventing rapid price increases. To be sure, KK&T were not the first to propose that “fairness” 
and related concepts may play a role in answering these questions. Before their contribution, for 
example, economist Arthur Okun hypothesized that “implicit contracts or conventions” between 
suppliers and customers might prevent suppliers from raising prices due to demand surges, and 
these implicit contracts or conventions might be rooted in shared (but inchoate) “fairness” norms.62 
These conventions, Okun suggested, are most likely to arise in markets characterized by repeated 
interactions and information asymmetries.63 Consider a supermarket: seasoned shoppers may not 
know the fair market value of every product in their cart, and they may prefer to spend their time 
in other ways than examining receipts and comparing prices to those charged elsewhere. A high 
level of trust in a particular supermarket saves us the opportunity cost of comparison shopping. 
The supermarket might jeopardize that trust, however, if it suddenly raises the price of an item by 
an exorbitant amount. 
 
 
61 See Appendix A (and supporting data from the link therein provided). 
62 Arthur M. Okun, Prices and Quantities: A Macroeconomic Analysis 170 (1981).  
63 Kahneman et al., supra note 11, at 728.  













KK&T pushed this point further, arguing that “[i]f considerations of fairness do restrict the 
actions of profit-seeking firms, economic models might be enriched by a more detailed analysis of 
this constraint.”64 This detailed analysis, they further suggested, should include empirical work on 
what practices consumers actually perceive to be “unfair” and “fair.”65 To that end, KK&T 
presented their sample of Canadian consumers with a variety of hypothetical scenarios and asked 
their respondents to rate a firm’s behavior as “completely fair,” “acceptable,” “unfair,” or “very 
unfair.”66 
 
KK&T’s headline result, noted in our Introduction, is that an overwhelming majority of 
their subjects considered it unfair for a firm to raise prices in response to a short-run increase in 
demand. As we note at the outset, roughly four-fifths of their respondents (82 percent) thought it 
was “unfair” or “very unfair” for a hardware store to raise the price of snow shovels from $15 to 
$20 the morning after a blizzard.67 By contrast, KK&T found that their participants generally did 
judge it fair for a seller to raise prices as a result of input cost increases. For example, 79 percent of 
respondents said it was “completely fair” or “acceptable” for a grocer to raise the price of a head 
of lettuce by 30 cents when a local shortage caused the wholesale price that the grocer paid for the 
lettuce to rise by 30 cents.68 KK&T observed a broadly similar pattern across their scenarios: 
consumers generally thought it was unfair for sellers to raise prices in response to shortages with 
no increase in costs.69 But if the sellers experienced increases in their own input costs, then 
consumers generally tolerated commensurate price hikes.70 
 
KK&T proposed the following explanation for their findings: “[C]ommunity standards of 
fairness,” they hypothesized, are governed “by a principle of dual entitlement.”71 According to this 
principle, consumers “have an entitlement to the terms of reference transactions,” while “firms are 
entitled to their reference profit.” A “reference transaction” is generally some transaction that has 
occurred in the recent past.72 For example, the pre-snowstorm sale of a snow shovel would be the 
relevant reference transaction the morning after a snowstorm. The pre-shortage sale of heads of 
lettuce would be the relevant reference transaction for sales after the local shortage strikes. 
However, as KK&T note, “[t]he relevant reference transaction is not always unique,” and 








68 Id. at 732. 
69 See id. at 733-35. 
70 See id. at 733. 
71 Id. at 729. 
72 See id. 
73 Id. at 730. 













KK&T posited that where price increases run afoul of the dual entitlement principle, sellers 
are likely to eschew price hikes, resulting in excess demand and shortages. According to KK&T, 
sellers—and especially sellers engaged in repeated interactions with their customers—will be 
reluctant to seize opportunities for short-term profits when price increases would erode their long-
term reputations for fair dealing. Invoking a maxim from the ski-resort industry, KK&T noted: 
“‘If you gouge them at Christmas, they won’t be back in March.’”74 A similar maxim may well 
apply to the coronavirus context (though with a less catchy refrain): If you gouge them at the peak of the 
pandemic, they won’t be back after the curve flattens. KK&T specifically cited “consistent evidence . . . from 
studies of disasters, where prices are often maintained at their reference levels although supplies 
are short.”75 
 
KK&T’s “dual entitlement” theory has inspired follow-on work examining perceptions of 
consumer fairness in a variety of settings.76 Subsequent studies indicate—among other findings—
that consumers generally are more tolerant of price increases in the context of services than 
goods,77 and that they react particularly negatively to individual-level price discrimination (i.e., 
circumstances in which different consumers are charged different prices).78 The inquiry most 
similar to our own is Margaret C. Campbell’s study of price fairness perceptions in the wake of a 
major earthquake in Southern California—the only other study we know of that was conducted 
during or immediately after a disaster.79 
 
Campbell conducted her study among first-year MBA students at UCLA’s business school 
one-and-a-half weeks after the January 1994 Northridge earthquake. The earthquake led to tap 
water disruptions, though—as Campbell notes—“no actual shortage of bottled water in the 
affected area.”80 Campbell told some of the students that a local store had raised the price of a 
gallon of bottled water from $3.60 to $4 after the earthquake, and told other students that the local 
store was charging the same $4-per-gallon price that it had charged pre-earthquake. She found 
that 65 percent of the students thought that the $4 price was unfair when told that it had been 
raised after the earthquake, whereas only 7 percent believed it was unfair when they believed the 
store had been charging $4 all along.81 Campbell also found that 35 percent of students thought 
 
74 Id. at 738. 
75 Id. 
76 For a literature review and overview of findings, see Farid Tarrahi, Martin Eisend & Florian Dost, A Meta-
Analysis of Price Change Fairness Perceptions, 33 Int’l J. Res. in Mktg. 199 (2016). 
77 Id. at 200 tbl.1; see also Lisa E. Bolton & Joseph W. Alba, Price Fairness: Good and Service Differences and the Role of 
Vendor Costs, 33 J. Consumer Res. 258 (2006) (finding circumstances in which consumers are more accepting of 
price increases in the service context than the goods context). 
78 See Kelly L. Haws & William O. Bearden, Dynamic Pricing and Consumer Fairness Perceptions, 33 J. Consumer Res. 
304 (2006).  
79 See Margaret C. Campbell, “Why Did You Do That?” The Important Role of Inferred Motive in Perceptions of Price 
Fairness, 8 J. Product & Brand Mgmt. 145 (1999). 
80 Id. at 147. 
81 Id. at 147-149.  













the price was unfair when they were told that the price increase from $3.60 to $4 had been planned 
since the beginning of the year but only took effect afterwards.82  
 
Campbell’s study highlights the potentially important role of seller motive in mediating 
consumer perceptions of fairness—a subject that we explore at greater length in the next section. 
It also suggests that KK&T’s snow-shovel result may not be specific to the Canadian-consumer 
context. Still, the potentially idiosyncratic sample—first-year MBAs at an elite business school—
make inferences to the broader population difficult. We do not fault the study’s author: nationwide 
surveys were considerably more difficult to conduct before Internet access and usage became 
widespread. Because anticipated bottled-water shortages did not materialize, moreover, Campbell 
could not examine reactions of consumers actually facing shortages in their own lives. Finally, more 
than a quarter-century has passed since Campbell’s study. As a result, we know little about present-
day consumers’ reactions to price increases in response to disaster-induced shortages. 
 
Our inquiry also contributes to related literatures regarding alternatives to price 
increases—such as quantity limits and auctions—and whether consumers perceive these 
alternative allocation mechanisms to be fair. Probably the most influential study of consumer 
fairness perceptions and quantity limits is a study by Nobel laureate Robert Shiller and his 
collaborators Maxim Boycko and Vladimir Korobov, who administered a telephone survey in 
Moscow and New York in 1990 that posed a series of questions to respondents regarding different 
allocation mechanisms. Of particular relevance, Shiller and his coauthors asked participants to 
choose which of two policies for reducing gasoline consumption was fairer: (1) “the government 
could prohibit gas stations from selling, for example, more than five gallons to one person,” or (2) 
the government could impose a tax on gasoline that would cause prices to go up. Majorities in both 
cities (57 percent in Moscow, 64 percent in New York) favored the tax over the quantity limit.83 
Twenty-one years later, John Marcis and coauthors asked students in a U.S. university’s first-year 
economics course whether it would be fair or unfair for the government to “limit gasoline stations 
from selling more than five gallons of gasoline to any one person.”84 Marcis and his coauthors 
found that views regarding this hypothetical policy were overwhelmingly negative: approximately 
72 percent of respondents considered the policy to be unfair.85  
 
Both of these studies point to possible aversion toward quantity limits. It is unclear, though, 
whether these results were driven by the fact that the government imposed the limit, by the relatively 
low limit (less than half the capacity of a typical sedan tank), or by a dim view of quantity limits writ 
large. Consumer perceptions of quantity limits are of particular interest in light of the widespread 
 
82 See id. at 148-49. 
83 Shiller et al., supra note 20, at 388-90. 
84 Marcis et al., supra note 20,  at 31 tbl.1. 
85 Id. at 32 tbl.2. 













voluntary use of rationing by stores across the United States during the Covid-19 pandemic to 
allocate in-demand items like hand sanitizer, toilet paper, and face masks.86 
 
Another way that sellers sometimes allocate scarce items—rather than raising prices or 
limiting quantities—is to utilize auctions. Again, a small empirical literature offers insights 
regarding consumer fairness perceptions of auctions. When KK&T asked survey participants to 
choose among three methods of rationing tickets to a sporting event—by auction, by lottery, or by 
queue (first-come first-served)—only 4 percent deemed the auction to be the “most fair” and 75 
percent said it was the “least fair.”87 When the authors asked participants whether it would be fair 
for a store with a single Cabbage Patch doll to auction it to the highest bidder the week before 
Christmas, 74 percent said it would be unfair.88 Interestingly, when KK&T gave subjects the same 
question but added that “the proceeds will go to UNICEF,” only 21 percent said that the use of 
the auction would be unfair.89 This finding indicates that consumer fairness perceptions may be 
sensitive not only to the choice of allocation mechanism but also to the destination of profits. 
 
Other studies suggest much greater receptivity toward auctions. When a University of 
Pennsylvania professor put KK&T’s Cabbage Patch doll question to first-year MBA students, he 
found that only 36 percent of MBAs considered the use of an auction for the remaining doll to be 
unfair.90 While MBAs may differ systematically from the general population, other studies with 
broader sample populations also indicate possible receptivity toward auctions. Yue Gao posed the 
same question (substituting Barbie dolls for Cabbage Patch dolls) to shoppers and train passengers 
in three areas of China and to train travelers, students, and cafeteria staff in Zurich and Basel, 
Switzerland, in 2008. Gao found that only 36 percent of Chinese respondents and 32 percent of 
Swiss respondents considered the use of an auction to be unfair, a figure that fell to 7 percent in 
China and 6 percent in Switzerland when the auction proceeds were donated to charity.91 Our 
study seeks to shed further light on these conflicting results. 
 
Finally, our investigation contributes to broader debates in the social and behavioral 
sciences literature regarding replicability and cross-cultural applicability. A key concern in the 
social and behavioral sciences over the past several years has been the reproducibility of landmark 
study results.92 Some phenomena, including many of the major findings related to risk perception, 
 
86 Michael Browne, Grocery Chains Limit Meat Purchases to Prevent Hoarding, Supermarket News, May 5, 2020, 
https://www.supermarketnews.com/meat/grocery-chains-limit-meat-purchases-prevent-hoarding. 
87 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. 
S285, S287-S288 & tbl.1 (1986). 
88 Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 11, at 735. That KK&T’s utilized a Cabbage Patch doll vignette 
may be the single most probative factor as to the study’s quondam currency. 
89 Id. at 736. 
90 See Kunreuther, supra note 21, at S331. 
91 See Gao, supra note 21, at 222 tbl.8. 
92 See Sean Laraway, Susan Snycerski, Sean Pradhan & Bradley E. Huitema, An Overview of Scientific Reproducibility: 
Consideration of Relevant Issues for Behavioral Science/Analysis, 42 Persps. on Behav. Sci. 33 (March, 2019).      












have been documented across survey conditions.93 Others, such as the endowment effect, appear 
to be more sensitive to experimental procedures.94 Related to the issue of replicability is the 
question of whether consumer fairness perceptions are stable across countries and cultures. 
 
Several subsequent academic contributions suggest that the dual entitlement principle may 
be robust to experimental conditions and cultural contexts, though evidence on this front is mixed. 
Bruno Frey and Werner Pommerehne managed to replicate KK&T’s result almost exactly in 
Switzerland and West Germany in 1987: whereas 82 percent of KK&T’s Canadian respondents 
considered a price increase for shovels from $15 to $20 after a snowstorm to be “unfair,” 83 percent 
of Frey and Pommerehene’s Swiss and West German respondents said the same. “This result can 
hardly be dismissed as coincidence,” the authors wrote.95  Shiller and his coauthors—in their 1990 
survey of Muscovites and New Yorkers—asked whether it was fair for florists to raise prices on a 
holiday when there is high demand for flowers. They found that nearly identical percentages of 
respondents—66 percent in Moscow, 68 percent in New York—considered such price increases 
to be unfair.96 Shiller and his coauthors considered this to be evidence of “fundamental parameters 
of human behavior related to the success of free markets.”97 Sheryl Kimes and Jochen Wirtz also 
find no significant differences across consumers in Singapore, Sweden, and the United States in 
their reactions to demand-based pricing in the restaurant industry.98  
 
Other studies, by contrast, find more substantial cross-cultural variation in consumer 
fairness perceptions. For example, Lisa Bolton, Hean Tat Keh, and Joseph Alba find that 
consumers in China—when evaluating the fairness of individual-level price discrimination—are 
more affected by what a friend paid than what a stranger paid, a finding that was not replicated 
among U.S. consumers.99 Haipeng (Allan) Chen and coauthors find that consumers in Singapore 
react more negatively than consumers in the United States to “asymmetric pricing”—i.e., raising 
 
93 A recent large-scale effort to reproduce key findings related to risk perception found a remarkably high degree 
of replicability across nineteen countries and thirteen languages. See Kai Ruggeri et al., Replicating Patterns of 
Prospect Theory for Decision Under Risk, Nature Hum. Behav. (June 2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-
0886-x; For a list of studies replicating the anchoring effect, see Amitai Etzioni, Behavioral Economics: Toward a New 
Paradigm, 55 Am. Behav. Sci. 1099, 1100-01 (2011).  
94 For an overview of the endowment-effect debate, see Keith M. Marzilli Ericson & Andreas Fuster, The 
Endowment Effect, 6 Annual Rev. Econ. 555 (2014). 
95 Bruno S. Frey & Werner W. Pommerehne, On the Fairness of Pricing—An Empirical Survey Among the 
General Population, 20 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 295, 298 (1993). John Marcis found that approximately 65 
percent of first-year economics students in their survey considered it unfair for a store to raise the price of an 
unspecified product from $15 to $20 on the morning after a hypothetical natural disaster. John G. Marcis, Alan 
B. Deck, Daniel L. Bauer & Vicki King-Skinner, A Study of Students’ Views of Market Fairness, 15 J. Econ. & Econ. 
Educ. Res. no. 2, at 25, 30-32 tbls.1-2 (2014). 
96 Shiller et al., supra note 20, at 388-89. 
97 Id. at 386 (emphasis in original). 
98 See Sheryl E. Kimes & Jochen Wirtz, Has Revenue Management Become Acceptable? Findings from an International Study 
on the Perceived Fairness of Rate Fences, 6 J. Servs. Res. 125 (2003). 
99 Lisa Bolton, Hean Tat Keh & Joseph Alba, How Do Price Fairness Perceptions Differ Across Culture?, 47 J. Mktg. 
Res. 564 (2010). 













prices in response to an input-cost increase but not cutting prices in response to an input-cost 
reduction.100 Nader Habibi finds that Shiller et al.’s result regarding preferences for taxes over 
rationing does not replicate for consumers in Iran.101 And as noted, efforts to reproduce KK&T’s 
auction-related findings in other settings have largely failed.102 
 
The literature documenting the contingency of fairness norms suggests a measure of 
caution in extrapolating from long-ago studies—even famous ones—to predict fairness perceptions 
among current consumers. “The past,” in the words of novelist L.P. Hartley, “is a foreign country: 
they do things differently there.”103 Canada is literally a foreign country, of course, and while they 
don’t do things so differently there, much has changed on both sides of the border since KK&T’s 
landmark study. In the ensuing decades, surge pricing has become routine in sports stadium 
ticketing,104 airline travel,105 and ride sharing, among other sectors. These developments in pricing 
practices may have made consumers more accustomed to demand-responsive price increases or, 
to the contrary, may have made them even more suspicious of price hikes. Such considerations 




II. Study Design  
  
         The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic presented a unique opportunity to explore the host of 
issues and quandaries described above. Accordingly, at the height of the crisis (at least its initial 
spring 2020 wave), we developed and administered two experimental protocols (“Experiment 1” 
and “Experiment 2”) in which participants read a series of different vignettes related to possible 
price markups of various goods during the crisis. Participants were asked to judge the fairness of 
the sellers’ behavior and the appropriate legal response to it. In both studies, participants were 
recruited by Cloud Research (formerly TurkPrime), a firm that uses Amazon’s MTurk platform to 
improve data quality and demographic representativeness above typical MTurk samples.106 This 
particular tool is now commonly used in articles published in top journals across disciplines, 
 
100 Hapiang (Allan) Chen, Culture, Relationship Norms, and Dual Entitlement, 45 J. Consumer Res. 1 (2018). 
101 Nader Habibi, Popular Attitudes Towards Free Markets in Iran, the Former Soviet Union & the United 
States (A Survey Analysis) 8 (Inst. for Research in Planning & Development, Working Paper No. 9515, 1995).  
102 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
103 L.P. Hartley, The Go-Between 1 (1953). 
104 See Jacob Young, Dynamic Ticket Pricing Use Takes Off, and Teams Hope It’ll Lure Fans Back Into Sports Stadiums, 
CNBC, Dec. 3, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/01/dynamic-ticket-pricing-use-takes-off-and-teams-
hope-itll-lure-fans-back-into-sports-stadiums.html. 
105 R. Preston McAfee & Vera te Velde, Dynamic Pricing in the Airline Industry (2006), 
https://mcafee.cc/Papers/PDF/DynamicPriceDiscrimination.pdf. 
106 See Leib Litman, Jonathan Robinson & Tzvi Abberbock, TurkPrime.com: A Versatile Crowdsourcing Data Acquisition 
Platform for the Behavioral Sciences, 49 Behav. Res. Methods 433 (2017); Jesse Chandler, Cheskie Rosenzweig, Aaron 
J. Moss, Jonathan Robinson & Leib Litman, Online Panels in Social Science Research: Expanding Sampling Methods Beyond 
Mechanical Turk, 51 Behav. Rsch. Methods 2022 (2019). 













including in consumer research,107 social psychology,108 political science,109 and law.110 Subjects 
were compensated $2.00 for completing all of the vignettes presented to them.111 From these 
experimental data, we tested several hypotheses that are of theoretical and legal significance related 
to price gouging. This Part explains our experimental design. Our core results can be found 
immediately following, in Part III. 
 
A. Experiment 1 
  
         In our first experiment, we sought to replicate the findings of KK&T’s landmark study and 
to expand upon them in a number of directions relevant to the current context. As explained above, 
KK&T reported that the overwhelming majority (82%) of their subjects considered it unfair for a 
hardware store to increase the price of snow shovels from $15 to $20 the day after a hypothetical 
snowstorm. An initial goal of our enterprise is to examine whether people in the throes of an actual 
crisis would react similarly. But in addition, we were interested in whether subjects would react 
differently to price increases for products more directly related to the pandemic. Accordingly, we 
tested participants’ beliefs about a price increase for Purell hand sanitizer.112 Further, KK&T’s 
findings cannot differentiate between unfairness associated with the absolute price increase ($5) or 
the relative price increase (33%). This is significant in the instant context because many price 
gouging statutes condition liability on a relative price increase over some baseline.113 Relative 
 
107 See, e.g., Nailya Ordabayeva & Daniel Fernandes, Better or Different? How Political Ideology Shapes Preferences for 
Differentiation in the Social Hierarchy, 45 J. of Consumer Rsch. 227 (2018); Adam Farmer, Blair Kidwell & David M. 
Hardesty, Helping a Few a Lot or Many a Little: Political Ideology and Charitable Giving, 30 J. of Consumer Psych. (2020), 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/jcpy.1164. 
108 See, e.g., Jeremy A. Frimer & Linda J. Skitka, Americans Hold Their Political Leaders to A Higher Discursive Standard 
Than Rank-And-File Co-Partisans, 86 J. Experimental Soc. Psych. (2020), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103119303427. 
109 See, e.g., Thomas C. O’Brien, Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Reconciling Police and Communities with Apologies, 
Acknowledgments, or Both: A Controlled Experiment, 687 Annals of Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sci. 8 (2020); Jane 
Lawrence Sumner, Emily M. Farris & Mirya R. Holman, Replication Data for: Crowdsourcing reliable local 
data (Cambridge U. Press, 2019), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-
analysis/article/crowdsourcing-reliable-local-data/E85E68746A4655FBD54F8F2A5A5525FC; Jared 
McDonald, Who Cares? Explaining Perceptions of Compassion in Candidates for Office, 42 Political Behavior (2020). 
110 See, e.g., Thomas C. O’Brien and Tom R. Tyler, Authorities And Communities: Can Authorities Shape Cooperation With 
Communities On A Group Level?, 26 Psych., Pub. Pol’y, & L. 69 (2020),  https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2019-
35693-001. 
111 This research was approved by Yeshiva University’s Institutional Review Board. 
112 We chose hand sanitizer rather than facemasks for two reasons. First, we developed our study protocol before 
the World Health Organization and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention began recommending 
widespread mask use. See Abby Goodnough & Knvul Sheikh, C.D.C. Weighs Advising Everyone to Wear a Mask, N.Y. 
Times (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/health/cdc-masks-coronavirus.html (noting 
that neigher organization recommended widespread mask use at the end of March). Second, vignettes using 
masks rather than hand sanitizer may have tread on particularly politically charged views regarding face masks 
that could have contaminated our results regarding price gouging. 
113 States and districts with statutes that utilize relative price increase triggers following an emergency declaration 
when compared with pre-declaration prices (whether with strict percentages or flexible standards) include 
Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, West Virginia, and 













increases may be less salient than absolute differences, however, especially when the percentage 
increase is high but the dollar value magnitude is low. For example, if a roll of toilet paper normally 
sells for $2, consumers might not notice or care about a $1 increase, despite its high relative 
magnitude.114 Thus, we ran conditions in which we could alternate the relative and absolute 
magnitudes of the price increases. 
  
Our design for Experiment 1 involved a between-subject analysis. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four mutually exclusive “arms” based on the type of goods that were 
being sold. In addition, each subject read three separate versions (or “conditions”) of the vignette 
in which the magnitude of the price increase varied. The order of presentation of each condition 
was random. Participants only saw the conditions pertaining to the specific arm to which they had 
been assigned. We explain each of the arms (and associated conditions) below. 
  
1. Hand Sanitizer Individual Bottles 
  
         The first arm (“Arm A”) presents a vignette that will serve as a key reference point across 
both experiments: Covid-19 related price changes associated with single bottles of hand sanitizer. 
The text for one condition of the vignette is as follows: 
 
A supermarket had been selling 8-ounce bottles of Purell hand sanitizer for $3. Several days after the 
first Covid-19 case was reported in the area, the supermarket increases the price of hand sanitizer to $4. 
  
After reading the short vignette, participants were asked to rate the fairness of the seller’s behavior 
using the same scale that KK&T used. 
  
Please rate the supermarket’s behavior. 
(1) Completely fair 
(2) Acceptable 
(3) Unfair 
(4) Very unfair 
 
 
Wisconsin; See also Delaware’s Executive Order, supra note 47; Maryland’s Executive Order, supra note 47; Minnesota’s 
Executive Order, supra note 47; New Mexico’s Consumer Advisory Warning, supra note 47; Washington Senate Bill 6699, 
supra note 46.  
114 See generally Ofer H. Azar, Relative Thinking In Consumer Choice Between Differentiated Goods And Services And Its 
Implications For Business Strategy, 6 Judgment & Decision Making 176 (2011) (reviewing literature and arguing that 
relative price differences appear to matter more than absolute differences). 
 














In addition, we also asked participants what they believed the appropriate legal response 
to the seller’s behavior should be. We chose a range of responses that are consistent with the 
available legal sanctions in various states.115 
 
If the authorities learn about the supermarket’s behavior, what do you think they should do about it? 
(1) Nothing 
(2) Take the hand sanitizer and pay the seller $3 per bottle 
(3) Take the hand sanitizer and pay the seller nothing 
(4) Take the hand sanitizer, pay nothing, and fine the supermarket $2500 
(5) Take the hand sanitizer, pay nothing, fine the supermarket $2500, and put the owner 
in jail for one year. 
 
Participants in Arm A also read two other variations on this vignette (presented in random order). 
In one of the conditions, the magnitude of the price was relatively large. Instead of raising the price 
to $4 (a 33% increase as illustrated above), the supermarket raised the price to $10 (a 333% 
increase). And in yet another condition, instead of raising the price, the supermarket did not change 
the price at all. Accordingly, participants saw the following three conditions in Arm A: 
 
● No Change in price from $3 
● An increase in price from $3 to $4 (33%) 
● An increase in price from $3 to $10 (333%) 
 
2. Hand Sanitizer 5-Packs 
  
         The second arm (“Arm B”) was similar to Arm A, but instead of the grocery store selling 
single bottles of Purell hand sanitizer initially priced at $3, it was now selling 5-packs of Purell hand 
sanitizer initially priced at $15. Once again, participants in this arm were asked to evaluate 
hypothetical price changes to the 5-pack also corresponding to 0%, 33% and 333% of the initial 
price. The text of the vignette read as follows: 
  
A supermarket had been selling 5-packs of 8-ounce bottles of Purell hand sanitizer for $15. Several 
days after the first Covid-19 case was reported in the area, the supermarket [increases the price of 
5-packs to ($20/$50)/continues to sell 5-packs for $15].   
  
Participants then answered the analogous questions about the fairness of the seller’s 
behavior and the appropriate response by the authorities (see above116). Thus, participants in Arm 
B saw the following three conditions, randomly presented: 
 
115 See Part I.B, supra and Appendix A, infra for details. Price gouging statutes (where they exist) vary significantly 
from state to state.  
116 The only variation in the wording of questions in Arm B related to the tailoring of the benchmark price of 
the pre-crisis status quo for choice number (2) in the legal response prompt. In Arm B, that choice read as follows: 














       
● No Change in price from $15 
● An increase in price from $15 to $20 (33%) 
● An increase in price from $15 to $50 (333%) 
  
3. Ice Scrapers 
  
         Our third arm (“Arm C”) moved incrementally towards the original KK&T setup, 
changing the unanticipated event to a sudden snowstorm (rather than a pandemic), the identity of 
the merchant to a hardware store (rather than a grocery store), and the product to a necessity in a 
snowstorm (rather than a public health crisis): an ice scraper initially priced at $3. We selected an 
ice scraper because it would plausibly carry an initial price similar to the single bottle of hand 
sanitizer in Arm A. The vignette read as follows: 
  
A hardware store had been selling ice scrapers for $3. The morning after a snowstorm in the area, the 
hardware store [continues to sell ice scrapers for $3; increases the price of ice scrapers to ($4/$10)]. 
  
After reading each vignette, participants once again answered questions about fairness and 
legal response. The randomly presented conditions in Arm C were: 
 
● No Change in price from $3 
● An increase in price from $3 to $4 (33%) 
● An increase in price from $3 to $10 (333%) 
 
4. Shovels (Replicating KK&T) 
  
         In our final set of vignettes (“Arm D”), we presented participants with a set of vignettes that 
included an exact copy of the language that KK&T studied, including the circumstances, the actor, 
the product, and the prices they analyzed. The vignette read as follows: 
  
A hardware store had been selling snow shovels for $15. The morning after a large snowstorm, the 
hardware store [raises the price of snow shovels to ($20/$50)/continues to sell shovels for $15].   
 
Participants then answered the same questions about the fairness of the seller’s behavior 
and the appropriate response by the authorities. Note that the three price increases in Arm D have 
the same relative percentage magnitudes (0%, 33%, and 333%) as those in Arms A–C, but the 
 
 
(2) Take the hand sanitizer and pay the seller $15 per 5-pack 
 
A type of consistency-preserving edit recurs in this prompt for the other Arms as well. 














absolute magnitude of the price increase is once again large (as in Arm B). Thus, participants in 
Arm D saw the following three conditions, randomly presented: 
       
● No Change in price from $15 
● An increase in price from $15 to $20 (33%) 
● An increase in price from $15 to $50 (333%) 
 
Of these three conditions, the 33% price increase scenario is an exact replica of the vignette posed 
by KK&T, providing us a basis for comparison not only to their study, but also to other variations 
in our other study arms. 
 
For future reference, the respective arms of Experiment 1 are summarized in Table 1. For 
all arms of the experiment (as well as Experiment 2, discussed below), participants answered a series 
of demographic questions after providing fairness and legal response assessments. Specifically, we 
collected data on participants’ age, gender identification, city, state, nature of community (urban, 
suburban, rural), household income, and political orientation (5-point “very conservative” to “very 
liberal”). We also asked whether any members of their household had been laid off, furloughed, or 
had their hours reduced because of the coronavirus outbreak. Finally, we asked whether they 
thought that the coronavirus outbreak was a major threat to their local community and to their 
country (5-point “Definitely yes” to “Definitely not”). 
 
  
  Arm A Arm B Arm C Arm D 
Sanitizer: NC/$4/$10 ✓    
Sanitizer 5-pack: NC/$20/$50  ✓   
Ice Scraper: NC/$4/$10   ✓  
Snow Shovel: NC/$20/$50    ✓ 
Table 1:  Arms for Experiment 1 
 
B. Experiment 2 
  
 Experiment 2 resembles Experiment 1, but it was designed to delve further into the nuances 
of consumer reactions to price gouging in a pandemic-specific context. Specifically, in Experiment 
2 we built on the conditions from Arm A of Experiment 1 with additional factual scenarios. While 
these additional scenarios vary, all subjects were commonly exposed to a baseline set of conditions 













identical to “Arm A” in Experiment 1. Consequently, Experiment 2 permits us to conduct within-
subject analysis as well as between-subject comparisons. 
 
1. Common Conditions 
  
         In all research arms of Experiment 2, participants once again read short vignettes about a 
seller’s behavior that they might consider unfair and/or worthy of legal sanction. All subjects 
confronted a baseline condition identical to Arm A from Experiment 1, involving a supermarket 
that sold Purell hand sanitizer before the coronavirus outbreak for $3 per bottle, with various 
altered pricing policies after the outbreak in the local community. To facilitate comparison, the 
vignette had the same language as did Arm A from Experiment 1: 
  
A supermarket had been selling 8-ounce bottles of Purell hand sanitizer for $3. Several days after the first 
Covid-19 case was reported in the area, the supermarket [increases the price of bottles of Purell hand sanitizer 
to ($4/$10)/continues to sell bottles of Purell hand sanitizer for $3].  
  
For each price-change condition (No change, $3 to $4, and $3 to $10), participants also answered 
the same questions about unfairness and appropriate legal response, as laid out in Arm A of 
Experiment 1 (see above).  Beyond these common prompts, the various arms of Experiment 2 
diverged to explore a series of alternative contexts, described in greater detail below. 
  
2. Quantity Restrictions and Auctions  
  
         The first variation we introduced in Experiment 2 considered the use of two alternative 
allocation mechanisms—quantity restrictions and auctions—instead of seller price markups. Many 
products have become especially scarce during the coronavirus outbreak, and some sellers have 
opted for alternatives to the standard first-come-first-served, sticker-price approach for market 
interactions. An alternative to first-come-first-serve rule that retains the sticker price approach 
intact is to impose quantity limitations on consumers.117 Here, a merchant might engage in self-
imposed rationing that restricts consumers’ ability to purchase as many goods as they would 
otherwise prefer. Two alternative hypotheses presented themselves. On the one hand, people 
might find quantity limits to be unfair. Many people may object to rationing on one level, because 
they believe that it may result in them not being able to purchase as much of a good as they desire. 
Certainly, ongoing debates about healthcare rationing in the U.S. can and have raised these 
 
117 See Hayley Peterson, Walmart may cut hours at stores open overnight and limit sales of high-demand items amid the coronavirus 
outbreak, Bus. Insider, Mar. 11, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-walmart-may-cut-store-
hours-and-limit-sales-2020-3; NBC Bay Area, Coronavirus Hoarding, Stores Limit Quantity on Some Items, NBC, Mar. 
13, 2020, https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/coronavirus-hoarding-stores-limit-quantities-on-some-
items/2253821/; Nicolette Accardi, Supermarkets, pharmacies placing limits on what you can buy. Here’s what you need to 
know, nj.com, Mar. 16, 2020, https://www.nj.com/business/2020/03/supermarkets-pharmacies-placing-limits-
on-what-you-can-buy-heres-what-you-need-to-know.html  














concerns.118 The findings of Shiller et al. and Marcis et al. also suggest that consumers share this 
view of rationing, though as noted above, the implications of those studies are not crystal-clear.119  
On the other hand, we conjectured that some people might find quantity limits appealing. They 
might think that rationing will increase their ability to at least buy some quantity of a good, because 
it will prevent others from hoarding it. Relatedly, people might view the broader distribution of 
goods as fair, because more people will be able to consume an otherwise scarce good. To explore 
these hypotheses, we offered the following scenario: 
  
A supermarket had been selling 8-ounce bottles of Purell hand sanitizer for $3. Several days after the first 
Covid-19 case was reported in the area, the supermarket continues to sell bottles of Purell hand sanitizer for 
$3, but it imposes a quantity limit of one bottle per customer. 
 
When supplies run particularly low, some sellers may consider simply abandoning sticker 
prices altogether and instead auctioning the items to the highest bidder. Conventional economic 
reasoning, in fact, considers an auction to be the most efficient means to distribute goods to those 
who value them the most. In contrast, and as noted above, there is mixed evidence regarding 
consumer receptivity toward auctions.120 We sought to understand whether evidence drawn from 
the coronavirus outbreak could clarify this ambiguity. Thus, in another condition of the 
experiment, participants read the following vignette: 
  
A supermarket had been selling 8-ounce bottles of Purell hand sanitizer for $3. Several days after the first 
Covid-19 case was reported in the area, the supermarket removes the bottles of hand sanitizer from its shelves, 
and it announces that it will sell its remaining bottles of Purell hand sanitizer to the highest bidder in an 
online auction. 
  
3. Apologies and Rationales 
 
A second set of variations we introduced concerned the effect of offering apologies and/or 
rationales in conjunction with a price change. Here we are motivated in part by the literature in 
behavioral economics,121 psychology,122 medicine,123 and law124 suggesting that expressions of 
 
118 See Paul Hsieh, Get Ready For Obamacare’s Medical Rationing, Forbes, Oct 3, 2012, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulhsieh/2012/10/03/get-ready-for-obamacares-medical-
rationing/#5055c3304ea3; Wall Street Journal Opinion, Killing ObamaCare’s Rationing Board, Wall St. J., July 1, 
2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/killing-obamacares-rationing-board-1435790411.  
119 See Shiller et al., supra note 20; Marcis et al., supra note 20. 
120 See Kahneman et al., supra note 11, at 735; Kunreuther, supra note 21, at S331; Gao, supra note 21, at 222 
tbl.8. 
121 See id. 
122 See, e.g., Katsuya Ohbuchi, Masaharu Kameda & N. Agarie, Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating 
Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 219 (1989).  
123 See, e.g., Nicole Saitta & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., Efficacy of a Physician's Words of Empathy: An Overview of State 
Apology Laws, 112 J. Am. Osteopathic Ass’n 302 (2012). 
124 See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement, 45 Court Rev. 90 (2009). 













contrition may help to dampen conflict, neutralize aggression, and even reduce settlement amounts 
in tort cases.125 Within our context, when merchants offer an apology or an explanation that they 
are raising prices in order to justify other goals that consumers value, consumers may be less likely 
to object to the increase. For example, people might be willing to pay higher prices when merchants 
are using the profits to pay salaries to workers affected by the crisis, or for other laudable goals.126 
  
         We attempted to study the independent and conjoined effects of apologies and rationales 
with three distinct variations: one with just a rationale, one with just an apology, and one with a 
rationale combined with an apology. The vignette is below. The rationale text is underlined, and 
the apology text is in bold (both only for purposes of this exposition). 
  
A supermarket had been selling 8-ounce bottles of Purell hand sanitizer for $3. Several days after 
the first Covid-19 case was reported in the area, the supermarket raises the price to $4. A sign at 
the front of the supermarket reads: “We have increased prices for some products in this store. All 
profits from these price increases will be used to provide paid leave to workers affected by Covid-19. 
We apologize for the inconvenience.” 
  
Depending on the condition to which they were (randomly) assigned, participants saw the 
underlined rationale text, the bolded apology text, or both. We ran each of these three 
permutations with an increase to $4 as well as an increase to $10, producing a total of six 
apology/rationale conditions. 
 
4. Merchants versus Non-Merchants 
 
A third variation in Experiment 2 hinged on the identity of the seller. As noted in the last 
Part, several state statutes proscribe price gouging only when perpetrated by merchants, retailers, 
wholesalers, suppliers, and other parties within a formal distribution chain, without explicitly 
restricting private individuals from increasing prices on goods that they sell.127 Others, in contrast, 
have proscribed gouging by all parties. Although there might be a number of reasons for this 
limitation, it did not seem obvious to us that people would be more offended by the behavior of 
business entities within a distribution chain than by that of private individuals. In fact, perhaps the 
most salient example of price gouging during the coronavirus outbreak involved an individual 
reselling masks, gloves, and other medical equipment to medical professionals.128 Accordingly, we 




126 Jody L. Ferguson, Pam Scholder Ellen & Gabriella Herrera Piscopo, Suspicion and Perceptions of Price Fairness in 
Times of Crisis, 98 J. Bus. Ethics 331, 335 (2011). 
127 See Appendix A. 
128 See Vigdor, supra note 61. 














A supermarket had been selling 8-ounce bottles of Purell hand sanitizer for $3. Several days after the 
first Covid-19 case was reported in the area, a local resident who purchased many bottles of Purell 
hand sanitizer at the supermarket begins to sell them out of a truck for [$4/$10].   
  
These conditions on price, product necessity, and seller identity allowed us to canvas most 
of the legally significant variations across states.  
 
5. Necessities vs. Luxuries 
  
         A final set of variations we introduced in Experiment 2 concerned whether the marked-up 
product was a necessity. Many jurisdictions impose liability for price gouging only on goods and 
services that are explicitly deemed necessary to people’s health and/or safety, such as household 
essentials, fuel, medicine, and shelter.129 Others proscribe price gouging even as to non-necessities 
(or “luxury” items). We were interested in whether this legal differentiation was consistent with 
people’s intuitions about the fairness of price increases during the coronavirus outbreak. As a proxy 
for a luxury item, we prompted subjects with additional questions related to bag of Lay’s potato 
chips130 originally priced at $3 per bag, with a supermarket increasing the price to $4 per bag, and 
then $10 per bag. The exact prompt we utilized was as follows: 
 
A supermarket had been selling 8-ounce bags of Lay's classic potato chips for $3. Several days after 
the first Covid-19 case was reported in the area, the supermarket raises the price to [$4/$10].   
 
          All told, Experiment 2 contains fifteen separate vignette conditions, including the baseline 
condition of hand sanitizer with no price change. We utilized a series of six distinct arms for this 
experiment out of concerns that reading numerous conditions would tax our participants unduly. 
Each resulting arm contains five conditions in all, as illustrated by Table 2. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the arms, and then the conditions within the arm were presented in 
random order. As noted above, each arm contained three common conditions that were the same 
as Arm A of Experiment 1, a feature we introduced to reaffirm our initial results as well as to allow 
for “within-subject” controls as a double-check on our analysis.131 
  
 
129 See Appendix A. States limiting application of their price gouging statute to necessities include: Georgia, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.  
130 In an unreported pretest, we asked participants to rate various products according to their importance to 
people’s health and safety during the coronavirus outbreak. Hand sanitizer was rated 4.1 out of 5 (“absolutely 
necessary”), while potato chips were rated 2.0. 
131 As discussed below, within-subject analysis is unnecessary if (a) one is careful about randomizing and (b) 
sample size is sufficiently large. These conditions are both satisfied in our study; and perhaps consequently, the 
introduction of within-subject controls does little to alter our results.  For a discussion of these considerations, see 
Byron Wm. Brown, Jr., The Crossover Experiment for Clinical Trials, 36 Biometrics 69 (1980). 













  Arm E Arm F Arm G Arm H Arm I Arm J 
Sanitizer: NC/$4/$10 (common baseline) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Sanitizer: Quantity Limit /Auction  ✓        
Sanitizer: $4/$10; Apology & Rationale    ✓      
Sanitizer: $4/$10; Apology Only   ✓    
Sanitizer: $4/$10; Rationale Only    ✓   
Sanitizer: $4/$10; Seller is Local Resident     ✓  
Luxury Good (Potato Chips): $4/$10      ✓ 
Table 2: Arms for Experiment 2 
 
As is increasingly common in studies such as ours, our data collection efforts made use of 
online solicitations over Amazon Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”). Given that we conducted our study 
at the height of a pandemic, in-person solicitations would have been infeasible, and telephone 
surveys increasingly run up against low response rates that cast doubt on external validity.132 
Although we undertook measures to ensure that our respondents had observable traits matching 
the overall demographic profile of the U.S. population, it is possible that our baseline results––
including our failure to replicate KK&T––are an artifact of the sample population and protocol 
we were compelled to employ. Of course, the same could be said of previous studies (e.g., that 
KK&T’s results may have been an artifact of the sample population of Toronto and Vancouver 
area residents answering their telephones during evening hours133). Moreover, we note that online 
and electronic platforms (like MTurk) have increasingly become modal channels for human 
interaction (as compared to telephone conversations/surveys employed by KK&T). At a 
minimum, then, our baseline results bear on the question of whether well-accepted behavioral 
economics findings carry over to twenty-first century modes of interaction. And many of our more 
interesting findings emerge from manipulations that we introduce on top of our baseline results. 
Here, we make note of an emerging literature demonstrating that interaction and treatment effects 
 
132 See Courtney Kennedy & Hannah Hartig, Response Rates in Telephone Surveys Have Resumed Their 
Decline, Pew Research Ctr. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/27/response-
rates-in-telephone-surveys-have-resumed-their-decline (noting 6% response rate for telephone surveys 
conducted by nonprofit public opinion research organization). 
133 See Kahneman et al., supra note 11, at 729 n.1. 














can be accurately measured with MTurk participants even when their baseline behavior differs 
from other available subject pools.134 
 
III. Results and Analysis 
 
Following the protocol described above, we collected data from 656 respondents in the first 
two weeks of May 2020.135 We sought a sample that was representative of the U.S. population, 
especially with respect to age, gender, and geography. The survey took on average just under four 
minutes to complete. For each arm of each experiment, we sampled between 60 and 70 
respondents, as depicted in Table 3. 
  
 
134 See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman, David L. Schwartz, Matthew L. Spitzer & Eric L. Talley, Patently Risky: Framing, 
Innovation and Entrepreneurial Preference, 34 Harv. J. L. & Tech. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2994560 (demonstrating nearly identical marginal treatment effects between 
MTurkers and university participants after controlling for differential baseline proclivities). 
135 In a pilot experiment executed approximately one week prior to this data collection effort, we also collected 
data from an additional 198 MTurk convenience sample; the results are not reported below, but are qualitatively 
similar. 















Experiment 1 N Percentage 
Arm A Hand Sanitizer ($3 Base Price) 65 9.91 
Arm B Hand Sanitizer ($15 Base Price) 61 9.3 
Arm C Ice Scraper ($3 Base Price) 63 9.6 
Arm D Shovel ($15 Base Price) 65 9.91 
Experiment 2 N Percentage 
Arm E Hand Sanitizer (Common) + Quantity / Auction 67 10.21 
Arm F Hand Sanitizer (Common) + Apology + Paid Leave 69 10.52 
Arm G Hand Sanitizer (Common) + Apology 67 10.21 
Arm H Hand Sanitizer (Common) + Paid Leave 68 10.37 
Arm I Hand Sanitizer (Common) + Resident Conditions 64 9.76 
Arm J Hand Sanitizer (Common) + Potato Chips Condition 67 10.21 
  Total 656 100 
Table 3: Distribution of Participants Across Arms of Experiments 1 and 2 
 
A. Descriptive Statistics and Respondent Demographics  
 
Table 4 presents summary statistics of our respondents’ demographic characteristics. 
Overall, our participants display reasonably strong covariate balance, with little to no statistically 
significant distributional differences across the respective arms.  Our subject pool was split roughly 
evenly between male and non-male participants (we had only one participant who identified as 
non-binary in gender, and we classified them as non-male). The mean respondent was 
approximately 37.4 years of age (within one year of the national median136), with a substantial 
variation in both directions. Approximately half of our subjects (48.2 percent) reported household 
incomes above $60,000, which again is consistent with Census data (the national median household 
 
136 Population Estimates Show Aging Across Race Groups Differs, U.S. Census Bureau (June 20, 2019), 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/estimates-characteristics.html. 














income in 2018 was $61,937).137 Approximately two-thirds of participants live in either rural or 
suburban areas, and they were geographically distributed throughout the U.S. in a fairly 
representative manner.138  
 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics (Means; Standard Deviations in italics)   
 
As detailed in the previous subsection, for each vignette, our participants chose one of four 
responses on an unfairness scale and one of five choices on a legal-response scale. The cross-
tabulated breakdown of these responses—with integer “scores” representing each ordered 
response—are depicted in Table 5, which pools data across both experiments, all participants, and 
all conditions. As illustrated by the table, Unfair assessments (columns) were roughly evenly split 
overall across the four ordered categories. Legal Response answers (rows), in contrast, were 
discernibly skewed towards mild responses, with fully half of our respondents overall opining that 
“Nothing” was the appropriate response. (This response came overwhelmingly from participants 
who evaluated the behavior in question as being either “Completely Fair” or “Acceptable.”) It 
bears noting that a second local mode in Legal Response assessments corresponds with a much more 
severe form of punishment entailing not only taking the item without compensation, but also fining 
the store/resident $2,500. (This response came overwhelmingly from participants who evaluated 
the seller’s behavior as either “Unfair” or “Very Unfair.”) 
 
137 Gloria Guzman, New Data Show Income Increased in 14 States and 10 of the Largest Metros, Table 1, U.S. Census 
Bureau (Sept. 26, 2019),  https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/09/us-median-household-income-up-
in-2018-from-2017.html. 
138 Jed Kolko, America Really is a Nation of Suburbs, Bloomberg, No. 14, 2018, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-14/u-s-is-majority-suburban-but-doesn-t-define-suburb 
(“According to the newly released 2017 American Housing Survey (of nearly 76,000 households nationwide), 
about 52 percent of people in the United States describe their neighborhood as suburban, while about 27 percent 
describe their neighborhood as urban, and 21 percent as rural.”). 














Table 5: Dependent Variable Cross-Tabulation (all participants/rounds)  
 
We hasten to note that––beyond the natural orderings they connote––integer scores 
assigned to both of dependent variables are relatively arbitrary. In particular, one must take care 
not to interpret the numerical scores in Table 5 as embodying the intensity of respondents’ views. 
One cannot be sure, for example, that the subjective “distance” between a “Completely Fair” 
assessment of Unfairness (scored as 1) and an “Acceptable” assessment (scored as 2) is the same as 
the distance between “Acceptable” and “Unfair” (scored as 3). Thus, while we find it convenient 
for expositional purposes to use this integer scoring rubric in summarizing our results, we also circle 
back in a subsequent section to verify that our qualitative results carry over to methods that steer 
clear of arbitrary cardinal ranking scales.139 
 
It is further worth noting that our dependent variable responses vary somewhat along 
certain demographic dimensions. Perhaps the most notable such covariation concerns the 
distributions of respondents’ answers subdivided by political ideology, as reflected in Figure A 
below. On the whole, as respondents grow more conservative, they are increasingly disinclined to 
describe behavior as “Unfair.” The pattern is somewhat more heterogeneous with respect to Legal 
Response. Very conservative respondents appear to be relatively more likely to recommend a legal 
sanction than other groups (particularly Very Liberal respondents), notwithstanding their lower 
overall proclivity to label conduct as unfair. This pattern may well be consistent with some theory 
of ideology, such as tradeoffs between when liability is triggered and the magnitude of sanctions.140 
On the other hand, conditional on recommending some type of punishment, very liberal 
respondents tend to be mildly more likely to prefer a severe punishment with “teeth,” such as a 
significant fine. Regardless of interpretation, it appears clear that if our experimental 
manipulations have an effect, they do so on top of a heterogeneous baseline as to some underlying 




139 Spoiler alert: It does not. See Appendix B, infra. 
140 See, e.g., Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968). 














Figure A: Dependent Variables as a Function of Politics 
 
B. Analysis of Vignette Responses 
 
We now proceed to analyze some of the key results from our survey. For ease of exposition 
and accessibility, we present our results using a series of visual representations and simple statistical 
means/distributional tests. For the more technically minded reader, in Subsection 3 and Appendix 
B we present our results using a variety of regression and qualitative-choice models (all of which 
are consistent with the visual representations below). 
 
1. Experiment 1 General Results 
 
We start with Experiment 1 (N=254), which endeavors (inter alia) to replicate the findings 
of KK&T. In each study Arm, participants were asked to evaluate the Unfairness of No-Change, 
a 33% price increase, and a 333% price increase. First consider the Unfairness assessment for each 
one of these conditions (comparing vignettes), as depicted in the Figure below. Note that unfairness 
assessments become more pronounced as the magnitude of the price increase grows. This is of 
course quite intuitive, and it was an intended result of our study design. Also, it appears that the 
range of price increases presented to participants do, in fact, “move the needle” in influencing 
participants’ unfairness responses. 
 
In addition, note that unfairness responses look relatively similar across all four vignettes, 
regardless of whether the item is a low value ($3) item or a higher cost purchase ($15), as well as 
regardless of whether it is a pandemic-related good (hand sanitizer) or a hypothetical snowstorm-
related purchase (ice scraper; shovel). Although not enormously surprising, it is worth noting that 
participants do not appear to tailor their unfairness evaluation to the moment. Nonparametric 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests categorically fail to reject the null hypothesis that the distributions 
across the four arms are identical for each price increase condition. 
 
  













Figure B: Unfairness Assessment (by Percentage Increase) 
 




Finally, and perhaps most significantly, notice that for moderate (33%) price increases in 
Panel (ii), our participants tend, on the whole, to assess the price change as relatively fair (or at least 
not unfair).  In all four study arms, in fact, a majority of participants found the 33% price increase 
to be either “Completely Fair” or “Acceptable.” This assessment, notably, is also manifest in Arm 
D, which is an exact replication of the scenario that KK&T presented to their Canadian 
participants. There, they report that a 33% increase in the price of a snow shovel during a blizzard 
was deemed “Unfair” or “Very Unfair” by 82 percent of their participants (N=107).141 We are not 
able to replicate the significant magnitude of that result; indeed, our results suggest that unfairness 
assessments are consistently and significantly milder than what KK&T measured for the same 
magnitude of price increase. Although we are able to generate unfairness assessments on the order 





141 Kahneman et al., supra note 11 at 729.  














Figure C: Legal Response Assessment (by Percentage Increase) 
 




The panels in Figure C present the analogous findings as in Figure B, but as applied to 
participants’ assessment of the appropriate legal response to each hypothesized action. In contrast 
to our participants’ unfairness assessments, subjects did exhibit some heterogeneity across the study 
arms in assessing legal response.  Two aspects of participants’ legal response preferences bear 
emphasizing. First, the plurality (and in many cases the majority) of participants tend to prefer no 
action (“Nothing”) in the face of no price change or even moderate (33%) price changes. Moreover, 
in those two conditions, participants’ responses are statistically indistinguishable across the four 
vignette arms of Experiment 1. Second, when price increases become extreme (333%), participants 
are far more willing to countenance significant legal implications, in particular seizing the product 
and fining the seller. But here, in contrast, we do find statistically significant differences among the 
different vignette conditions. Participants presented with the two hand sanitizer vignettes are 
significantly more likely to advocate severe punishment for extreme price gouging than participants 
presented with either the analogous ice scraper or snow shovel vignettes.142 Thus, it appears that 
while participants do not appear to respond to salient market panics in assessing the fairness of a 
 
142 Under a nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we reject the hypothesis of identical distribution in both 
cases (p=0.029 and p=0.011, respectively). 













price increase, they do (on average) support steeper penalties for perceived unfair behavior when 
the product is closely tied to an ongoing and salient event, such as Covid-19. 
 
Analysis of our data revealed that there appeared to be discernible and consistent 
differences in our participants’ responses as their political ideologies varied from liberal to 
conservative on a 5-point scale (-2 to 2, respectively). To tease out this tendency further, we delved 
into whether the effects noted above were related to political differences among participants. Figure 
D reproduces Panel (iii) from Figure C, but it separates between “Conservative” participants (with 
politics scores of 1 or 2 in the scale summarized above) and “Non-Conservative” participants (with 
politics scores between -2 and 0). As one can see from Figure D, non-conservatives appear (on the 
whole) to skew more heavily towards severe sanctions than do conservatives, and they do so 
particularly in the hand sanitizer vignettes. This effect is especially pronounced in Arm B, which 
relates to a 5-pack of hand sanitizers and a price increase from $15 to $50. In contrast, 
conservatives appear to respond more mildly on the whole to non-conservatives when it comes to 
legal sanction, and their response is largely consistent across all different vignettes. 
 
Figure D: Legal Response for Extreme Price Increase (by Politics) 
 





2. Experiment 2 General Results 
  
With the results of Experiment 1 providing a baseline, we now move on to consider 
Experiment 2 (N=402), which expands outward from the $3 Hand Sanitizer vignette in Arm A 
from Experiment 1. In this experiment, all participants commonly received that same vignette, but 
then were channeled into a set of variations, exploring alternative rationing devices, 
apologies/rationales, different products, and the identity of the seller. 













Common Vignettes  
 
We begin with the three “common vignettes” presented to all participants regardless of 
study arm: (1) No Change; (2) Merchant increases price for hand sanitizer from $3 to $4; and (3) 
Merchant increases price for hand sanitizer from $3 to $10.  Figure E illustrates participants’ 
aggregated unfairness rankings and legal response rankings for each of these vignettes. These 
results are substantially similar to our single-pack hand-sanitizer results from Experiment 1 (see 
Figure B). We report these results again for Experiment 2 to confirm that the sample population 
for Experiment 2—recruited through the same mechanism as Experiment 1—shares similar 
fairness intuitions. Moreover, these distributions are statistically indistinguishable143 from those 
reported in Arm A of Experiment 1 above, which (recall) presented participants with identical 
vignettes as did the common conditions.  
 
Figure E: Common-Vignette Responses (All arms) 
 
 
143 For example, using a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we resoundingly fail to reject the hypothesis 
of identical distributions for both Unfairness and Legal Response rankings. 
















To underscore and summarize an important difference between our results and those of 
KK&T, it is helpful to pool results across Arm A from Experiment 1 and the identical common 






$3 to $4 
Hand 
Sanitizer 
$3 to $10 
Hand 
Sanitizer 
Completely fair 83.08% 11.99% 4.71% 
Acceptable 12.42% 45.40% 9.42% 
Unfair 3.43% 34.90% 24.41% 
Very unfair 1.07% 7.71% 61.46% 
Fair Total (Completely Fair + Acceptable) 95.50% 57.39% 14.13% 
Unfair Total (Unfair + Very Unfair) 4.50% 42.61% 85.87% 
Total Responses 467 467 467 
 
Table 6: Breakdown of Responses by Condition  
(Experiment 1, Arm A combined with Experiment 2 Common Qs, Arms E - J) 
 
As the pooled data results from Table 6 illustrated, a 33% price increase elicited a negative 
response (i.e., “Unfair” or “Very Unfair”) from just under 43% of participants (in contrast to the 














82% reported by KK&T144). Within our subject pool, it is possible to generate negative assessments 
comparable to those reported by KK&T (in our case 86%), but doing so entailed presenting 
subjects with an extreme price increase (333%) that was an order of magnitude higher than that 
reported by KK&T (33%). 
Quantity Restrictions and Auctions (Arm E)  
 
Now consider the participants in Arm E (N=67), who were presented with two additional 
mechanisms for allocation other than changing prices as in the common conditions: Quantity 
Restrictions and Auctions. The figures below illustrate respondents’ answers for both Unfairness 
and Legal Response. For the purposes of comparison, we have reproduced the two common 
conditions involving an actual price change on the right two frames of each panel. 
 
As depicted by Figure  F, participants displayed drastically different attitudes towards these 
two alternative allocation devices. While participants viewed Auctions with particular distaste, 
Quantity Restrictions were considered significantly fairer than any attempt to ration by price. The 
mean Unfairness score was 1.343 for Quantity Restrictions and 3.403 for Auctions, as compared 
for 2.366 for the Merchant $3 to $4 (“M3to4”) condition and 3.405 for Merchant $3 to $10 
(“M3to10”). Quantity restrictions appear to be viewed as fairer than even moderate price increases 
from $3 to $4.145 Strikingly, only 3% of the subjects in our sample viewed rationing of necessary 
health supplies during a pandemic to be unfair or very unfair. Auctions, by contrast, were viewed 
as significantly more unfair than the moderate price increase,146 and approximately on par with an 
extreme price increase from $3 to $10.147 With the exception of the M3to10 and Auction 
distributions, we reject all other hypotheses of equivalence for the remaining distributions at every 
conventional significance level. The resoundingly negative reaction to auction protocols is 
intriguing, since auction protocols are widely considered by economists to be among the most 
efficient allocation mechanisms.148 
 
Participants’ attitudes about Legal Response followed a similar pattern. The mean score 
for Quantity Restrictions (1.328) was on par with the No Change condition (1.323), and 
substantially lower than for the M3to4 condition (1.821).149 The mean score for Auctions (3.239) 
was roughly on par with the M3to10 condition (3.405), and they are not statistically different from 
one another.150 Distributional tests cannot reject the hypothesis that the Auction responses are 
 
144 Kahneman et al., supra note 11, at 729.   
145 A means test rejects the null hypothesis of equivalence between Quantity Restrictions and the M3to4 
condition (t=7.640; p=0.000). 
146 t=6.998; p=0.000. 
147 t=1.276; p=0.2042. 
148 See Part 1.A, supra. 
149 We reject the hypothesis of equivalence between Quantity Restrictions and M3to4 (t=3.3625; p=0.001). 
150 t=0.7959; p=0.4275. 













equivalent to the M3to10 condition,151 while the Quantity Restrictions condition is mildly more 
left skewed than the M3to4 condition.152  
 







151 p=0.730, two-tailed test. 
152 p=0.069, two-tailed test. 














Apologies and Rationales (Arms F, G, H) 
 
We now turn to the use of apologies and/or rationales as a way to “soften the blow” of 
price changes. We designed several arms of our study to analyze whether adverse reactions to a 
price increase can be mollified by accompanying it with an apology and/or a rationale for it that 
directs the added funds to a socially valuable use (in this case subsidizing furloughed workers). 
Participants in Arm F of our study (n=69) considered price increases that were accompanied by 
both an apology and a rationale.  
 


















Figure G summarizes the results (with the baseline results for the analogous “naked” price 
change included for reference). As is clear from the Figure, providing an apology/rationale 
alongside a price change has a striking effect, mollifying participants’ adverse reactions 
considerably. Its inclusion is associated with a behaviorally and statistically significant reduction in 
both Unfairness and Legal Response scores. For the former, the effect is manifest across both 
moderate price increases (mean declines from 2.366 to 1.710)153 and extreme price increases (mean 
declines from 3.405 to 2.551).154 Indeed, the effects of an apology/rationale are so strong for 
extreme ($3 to $10) price increases as to move unfairness scores to be statistically on par with 
moderate price increases absent an apology or rationale.155 
 
The effects for Legal Response are analogous. We find statistically significant reductions in 
mean score for moderate price increases (mean declines from 1.821 to 1.406)156 and extreme price 
increases (mean declines from 3.112 to 2.000).157 And the use of an apology/rationale with an 
extreme price increase similarly moves Legal Response reactions to be on par with those typifying 
a moderate ordinary price increase.158  
 
Although these interaction results are relatively striking, they also raise the question of 
whether the apology or the rationale is carrying the most water. To address this question, we 
replicated Arm 2’s approach in Arms G and H of the study.  In Arm G, participants (N=67) were 
given only an apology for the price change with no rationale, while in Arm H, participants (N=69) 
were provided with a rationale with no apology. Figure H presents the results, including the 
combined apology/rationale outcomes from Arm F and the analogous “naked” price increase 
outcomes from the command conditions for reference. The left column summarizes the moderate 
price increase case (from $3 to $4), while the bottom panel depicts the extreme price increase (from 
$3 to $10). As can be seen from the diagrams, it appears that apologies and rationales can each 
play some role in mollifying subject responses to a price increase. However, in at least this case, the 
effect of the rationale appears to be the largest. This particular strength of rationales (in comparison 
with Apologies) is confirmed in the more detailed regression-analysis analysis presented in 
Appendix B. We caution the reader not to over-interpret the relative strength of rationales versus 
apologies as seen in this study to carry over generally. It warrants noting that our vignettes’ rationale 
(subsidizing furloughed workers) was particularly public-minded, while the apology (a general 
apology for inconvenience) may come off as relatively unsentimental. Rather, our results are 
sufficient to demonstrate that both devices can serve to “soften the blow” of a price increase, and 
that their combination can be particularly potent. 
  
 
153 t=6.4482; p=0.000. 
154 t=7.7269; p=0.000. 
155 p = 0.729, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
156 t=2.7801; p=0.006. 
157 t= 6.7752; p=0.000. 
158 p = 0.137, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 














Figure H: Decomposing Apologies and Rationales (Left: $3 to $4; Right: $3 to $10) 
Luxuries versus Necessities (Arm I) 
 
We now move on to consider the extent to which price increases elicit distinct responses for 
luxury items rather than necessities. We conjectured that, particularly during the time period for our 
data collection when Covid-19 spread was rampant in the U.S., respondents would be particularly 
repulsed by sudden price increase for a health necessity (hand sanitizer) in comparison to a relative 
“luxury” item (potato chips). Arm I of our study (N=64) therefore asked respondents to consider 
additional vignettes that replicated the hand-sanitizer vignettes but with potato chips substituted 
instead. 
 
Interestingly, we did not detect a significant attitudinal difference in our respondents when 
the vignette switched from a necessity to a luxury. As illustrated in Figure I, the overall distributions 
of opinions as to both Unfairness and Legal Response vignettes for potato chips remain virtually 
identical to those involving hand sanitizer. Indeed, we are unable to detect any significant 
difference between means for any condition, and the respective distributions for hand sanitizer and 
potato chips are statistically indistinguishable.  














Figure I: Price Gouging on Luxuries versus Necessities 
 
 We find this result surprising, and inconsistent with our a priori conjectures regarding 
Experiment 2. It is possible that the time period for data collection (early May 2020) was one where 
price gouging (and taking offense to it) was particularly salient, and thus the coronavirus crisis 
served to amplify all adverse reactions to price increases categorically. Alternatively, participants 
may have been concerned about possible food shortages, and thus they responded just as negatively 
to a price increase for any food item. That said, it is interesting to note that during a crisis the 
revulsion to plausible price gouging does not appear to “play favorites” between bona fide 
necessities (that were notoriously in short supply)159 and luxuries (that were not). 
 
159 Parija Kavilanz & Vanessa Yurkevich, A plan to ease the hand sanitizer shortage could go bust, CNN, May 1, 2020, 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/01/business/hand-sanitizer-ethanol-fda/index.html. 














Non-Merchants versus Merchants (Arm J) 
 
The final arm of Experiment 2 concerns the identity of the price gouging actor. Does it 
matter whether the actor is a merchant versus a common citizen who hoards retail items in an 
effort to flip them for a profit? As noted above, many state price-gouging statutes limit their 
application to merchants, excluding non-merchants.160 In Arm 6 (N=67), we replicated the two 
price increase conditions ($3 to $4 and $3 to $10) from the common vignettes, but instead 
substituted a non-merchant in place of the merchant as the pivotal actor who was selling for a 
markup.  
 
Figure J illustrates our results, including the baseline price-increase results for merchants as 
a reference. For extreme price increases ($3 to $10) we were unable to detect any significant 
difference in respondents’ attitudes when the identity of the seller is a non-merchant (either at the 
mean or distributional level). For more moderate price increases ($3 to $4) we did detect a small 
difference, but in the opposite direction of standard price gouging statutes: respondents were mildly 
more (not less) inclined to consider price increases by a non-merchant to be unfair,161 and significantly 
more (not less) disposed to recommend some sort of legal sanction.162  
 
The penchant for participants to be somewhat more inclined to be displeased with non-
merchants’ behavior than merchants’ behavior is interesting, and it presents a tension with the way 
that most price-gouging statutes are currently crafted. We return to the normative policy 





160 Distribution Chain States, supra note 57; see Appendix A. 
161 Means t-test: p = 0.0833; Kolmogorov-Smirnoff distribution test: p = 0.255. 
162 Means t-test: p = 0.0236; Kolmogorov-Smirnoff distribution test: p = 0.0236. 



































3. Regression Analysis 
 
 While the graphical plots and summary statistics presented above are helpful, it is possible 
to get a more precise assessment of our results using regression analysis and related qualitative-
response variants. For technically minded readers, we outline this approach below. Although this 
more technical analysis allows us to unpack a few more nuances to our results, it principally 
reinforces our key results that have already been depicted. 
 
For Experiment 1, our response data permit predominantly “between-subject” analysis, 
i.e., the different arms involved wholly distinct participants, and thus participants in that 
experiment did not confront a common vignette. In Experiment 2, however, additional analysis is 
possible. Although each experimental arm guided participants through different manipulations, 
we also made sure to design Experiment 2 in a way that exposed all participants to a baseline set 
of vignettes involving (1) No Change; (2) A merchant’s 33% price increase for hand sanitizer from 
$3 to $4; and (3) A merchant’s 333% price increase for hand sanitizer from $3 to $10. The 
respective arms of Experiment 2 then branched out from these baselines. Consequently, the 
responses to common vignettes can be helpful for statistical reasons, since they permit us to 
benchmark our participants against one another in identical circumstances, exploiting the quasi-




For Experiment 1, the naturally ascending categories for expressing views about unfairness 
and legal response suggest that a standard ordered qualitative response specification is appropriate. 
Table 7 presents between-subject ordered logit estimates163 for Unfairness (clustered at the 
respondent level). In this and all other tables, the omitted category is the No Change condition, so 
that all coefficient estimates for our manipulations should be interpreted relative to that baseline.   
 
The first two model specifications of the Table reflect the entire data set, differing only by 
the inclusion of demographic control variables (present in Model 2 but not Model 1).164 Note from 
Model 2 that among the demographic controls, only politics appears to have a significant predictive 
effect on unfairness assessments, and more conservative participants appear to have lower 
proclivities across vignettes to ascribe unfairness to posited behavior. Models 3 and 4 are analogous 
to models 1 and 2, but are limited to “conservative” participants (defined as having political 
ideologies that are either “Somewhat Conservative” or “Very Conservative”– representing just 
 
163 In this and other qualitative-response regressions we employ ordered logit (rather than probit) models. Our 
results do not appear to turn appreciably in which of these two dominant options is employed. 
164 Because each subject responded to three separate vignettes, the total number of observations reported in the 
following tables (n=762) is three-times the total number of individual respondents in Arms A through D as 
reflected in Table 3 (n=254). 













under 50% of the data). Models 5 and 6 do the same, but they are limited to “non-conservative” 
participants.  
 
As is apparent from the table, a $3 to $4 price increase by a merchant is significantly more 
likely to elicit an unfairness response assessment over the “No Change” condition, and a $3 to $10 
increase by a merchant is even far more likely to do so. And, notwithstanding the fact that our 
results appear milder economically than KK&T’s on this score, both of these effects are strongly 
statistically significant. Note as well that the coefficient on the $3 to $4 merchant price increase is 
close to those of the other 33% price increases (M15to20, H3to4 and H15to20). And indeed, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis that these coefficients are all identical.165 Similarly the coefficient 
on the $3 to $10 merchant price increase is close to those of the other 333% price increases 
(M15to50, H3to10 and H15to50), and we similarly fail to reject the null hypothesis of identical 
coefficients.166  
 
Conservative participants appear across the board to be less likely than non-conservatives 
to find any action unfair, and the differences between conservative and non-conservative 
participants are uniform and statistically significant whenever the underlying manipulation is as 
well. However, both conservative and non-conservative participants once again behave in 
statistically comparable manners for 33% price changes, as well as 333% price changes, regardless 
of the vignette. In addition, and somewhat surprisingly, participants reporting that Covid-19 had 
visited significant local effects where they live appeared less likely to view price increases as unfair. 
We posit that this may be due to a reckoning of at least some respondents to the practical reality 
that when local scarcity becomes salient, it may necessitate some form of rationing adjustment 
(through price or other mechanisms). In fact, we observe that the ameliorating predictive influence 
of local Covid-19 effects is almost exclusively concentrated in conservative respondents, suggesting 
that conservatives are more inclined to accept price increases in the face of salient local shortages. 
 
Table 8 reports corresponding regression analysis findings for participants’ Legal Response 
answers. As with unfairness, participants favor increasingly severe legal responses as the price 
increase escalates from 33% to 333% across all vignettes. Moreover, at least for 33% price 
increases, participants on the whole appear to manifest comparable views across the four vignettes 
presented to them.167 For extreme price increases (333%), however, participants’ views of legal 
response appear to become relatively more severe for the hand sanitizer vignettes, and we strongly 
reject the hypothesis of identical coefficients across those conditions.168 When breaking down the 
estimates across conservative/non-conservative dimensions, we find that this distinction is 



















identical coefficients for the 333%-increase coefficients,169 but we once again soundly reject it for 
non-conservative respondents.170  
 
It also merits observing from Table 8 that salient local Covid-19 effects predict differential 
legal response ratings, but in the opposite direction as unfairness. Participants reporting local effects 
are more inclined to favor harsh punishments (even as they are less inclined to find unfairness, per 
Table 7). In addition, there does not appear to be a strong interaction with political leanings, as 
conservatives and non-conservatives appear to react similarly on the legal-response dimension in 





















































We now move on to our Experiment 2 regressions. Consider first a “between-participants” 
analysis similar to that conducted for Experiment 1 above, where we do not attempt to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the subject level. Table 9 presents between-subject ordered logit 
estimates for Unfairness (clustered at the respondent level). In this and all other tables, the omitted 
category is the No Change condition, so that all coefficient estimates for our manipulations should 
be interpreted relative to that baseline.   
 
As with the previous results, the first two model specifications of Table 9 are run using the 
entire data set, differing only in the inclusion of demographic control variables (present in Model 
2 but not Model 1). Models 3 and 4 are similar but are limited only to “conservative” participants 
(whose political ideologies are identified as either “Somewhat Conservative” or “Very 
Conservative” – representing just under 50% of the data). Models 5 and 6 do the same, but they 
are limited to “non-conservative” participants.  
 
The regression coefficients reported in Table 9 reinforce much of the graphical / tabular 
analysis above. For example, while a $3 to $4 price increase does indeed elicit a statistically 
significant shift towards a negative response (relative to the “No Change” condition), a $3 to $10 
increase is substantially more likely to do so. Moreover, the coefficient estimates are extremely close 
in magnitude for the coefficient estimates delivered by Experiment 1 (see Table 7 above), 
reinforcing this common set of experiments as a baseline. Conservative participants appear 
consistently to be less likely than non-conservatives to find an action unfair. Consistent with Figure 
I (and inconsistent with many states’ price gouging laws) participants’ responses to conditions 
involving necessities (hand sanitizer) and luxuries (Lay’s potato chips) are statistically equivalent on 
unfairness grounds. Likewise, respondents’ reactions on unfairness also diverge from many state 
regimes in that they do not hinge on whether a given price increase is due to a merchant’s repricing 
decision or a resident who has hoarded products for sale on the market (consistent with Figure J). 
If anything, a negative reaction to a price increase is stronger when the seller is a non-merchant 
(particularly for moderate price increases). 
 
Participants reacted quite differently to the two rationing devices that did not explicitly 
change sticker prices (rationing and auctions). Although participants found quantity restrictions to 
be more unfair than the No Change case, the effect is numerically small and borderline 
insignificant on conservative/non-conservative subsamples. It is safe to say that such measures 
were deemed far and away the fairest responses that we considered. Auctions, in contrast, were 
greeted with the opposite reaction, and were viewed as far and away the most unfair means for 
allocation of those analyzed. And the revulsion to auctions was manifest among conservative and 
non-conservative respondents alike. 
 













Finally, and consistent with Figures G and H, accompanying a price increase with an 
apology/rationale dampened participants’ assessments of unfairness. The effect was most 
pronounced when the apology and rationale were combined.  The use of a rationale alone (with 
no apology) was nearly as effective at dampening sentiments of unfairness, while a naked apology 
(with no rationale) had a discernibly smaller effect. 
 
The legal response regressions in Table 10 are broadly consistent too, but with a few 
caveats. On the whole, participants were more punitive towards larger price increases, and (like 
Table 8) those reporting significant local and household Covid-19 effects were the most retributive. 
But they were comparatively punitive towards price increases relating to the luxury item (Lay’s 
potato chips) as to the necessity (hand sanitizer). And residents who price gouge are assessed slightly 
more punitively than merchants. Apologies combined with rationales go far to dampen the severity 
of respondents’ preferred sanction. As before, offering a rationale alone appears to be slightly more 
effective than offering an apology alone. 
 
Because Experiment 2 (unlike Experiment 1) contains several common questions that all 
participants answered regardless of arm, it also affords us the ability to control for unobserved 
forms of respondent heterogeneity using a “within-subject” analysis—effectively treating 
individuals as their own control group. The details are somewhat technical, however, and we thus 
relegate them to Appendix B, where we demonstrate the robustness of our results using several 
alternative approaches that appear to have gained traction in the literature. For present purposes, 
however, the principal take-away from that analysis is that, even after implementing these more 
technically involved approaches, we obtain results that are extremely close (and indeed, virtually 
identical) to those in the between-subject analyses discussed here. The robustness of our results 
should not be too surprising, of course, since we randomized our treatment arms across a large 
number of participants, thereby minimizing the danger that unobservable heterogeneity drives our 
results (since the ideal way to address such heterogeneity concerns is, after all, a large randomized-
control trial). Nevertheless, our confidence in the between-subject results is further bolstered by the 
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4. The Potential Role of Order Effects 
 
Because the divergence between our results and the existing literature is surprisingly stark, 
we close this section by exploring one plausible culprit for this divergence: “question order effects,” 
whereby people may respond to a series of vignettes differently depending on the sequence in which 
each vignette is presented to them. Recall that in all of our experiments, participants were 
confronted with three different price change conditions, ranging from none to moderate to 
extreme. In KK&T’s pioneering study, in contrast, only the moderate price change condition 
appeared.  Might ordering have played a role in inducing our participants to behave so differently? 
 
It is a fair question. Researchers have documented question order effects in a wide range 
of survey experiment contexts.171 Some scholars have hypothesized that question order is most 
likely to affect responses among individuals whose attitudes are weak or uncertain.172 Intuitively, 
this hypothesis seems quite plausible: a die-hard coffee ice cream fan will presumably say she 
prefers coffee ice cream every time, though question order may affect her relative rankings of, say, 
cookie dough and rocky road. The social science literature is not unified on this score, however: 
early empirical analyses revealed a muddled relationship between attitude strength and 
susceptibility to question order effects,173 though recent research suggests that order effects can 
exist and tend to be strongest when individuals are uncertain of their views.174  
 
 To explore this question, we return to Experiment 1, where all participants were asked to 
assess price increases of 33 percent and 333 percent, as well the no-change condition. By design, 
the order in which participants encountered the differing price-change conditions varied 
randomly. It is possible, though, that the order of the price change vignettes could push 
respondents in one of two directions. One possibility is that question order could generate a 
“priming” effect: participants asked to assess the higher (333 percent) increase might become 
primed to think of the hypothetical seller as engaged in unfair pricing practices, and that all price 
increases are bad, thereby causing them to evaluate the (subsequent) 33 percent price increase 
scenario more negatively. An alternative possibility is that question order could generate a 
“benchmark” effect: those participants asked to assess the 333 percent price increase first might 
come to think of 333 percent as a comparator against which the more moderate 33 percent price 
 
171 For a literature review and illustration, see Peter Siminski, Order Effects in Batteries of Questions, 422 Quality & 
Quantity 477 (2008). 
172 See Howard Lavine, Joseph W. Huff, Stephen H. Wagner & Donna Sweeney, The Moderating Influence of Attitude 
Strength on the Susceptibility to Context Effects in Attitude Surveys, 75 J. Personality & Social Psychol. 359, 361 (1998).  
173 See George F. Bishop, Issue Involvement and Response Effects in Public Opinion Surveys, 52 Pub. Opinion Q. 209 
(1990) (finding no relationship between order effects and issue involvement); Jon A. Krosnick & Howard 
Schuman, Attitude Intensity, Importance, and Certainty and Susceptibility to Response Effects, 54 J. Personality & Soc. 
Psychol. 940 (1988) (finding no relationship between order effects and measurements of attitude intensity, 
importance, and certainty). 
174 See Katrin Auspurg & Annette Jäckle, First Equals Most Important? Order Effects in Vignette-Based Measurement, 46 
Sociol. Methods & Research 490, 520 (2017). 













increase would look quite reasonable. Under this hypothesis, presenting participants with the 
extreme price increase first might effectively dampen their subsequent disapprobation of a more 
moderate one.175 
 
 We explored this question by disaggregating our subject pool in Experiment 1 by the 
(randomized) sequence in which they encountered price change conditions. Figure K reproduces 
Panel (ii) from Figure B (corresponding to the moderate 33 percent price increase), but it separates 
respondents into two groups: (1) those who saw the 33 percent price increase vignette before the 
333 percent increase vignette (HiB4Lo=0) and (2) those who saw the 33 percent price increase 
vignette after the 333 percent vignette (HiB4Lo=1).  
 
Figure K: Unfairness Assessment (by Percentage Increase and Order Effects) 
 
Panel (i)     Panel (ii) 
 
 
The results suggest that order effects interact meaningfully with our results, in a manner 
consistent with the “benchmark” hypothesis posited above. Depending on the product, between 
50 percent and 67 percent of respondents rated the 33 percent price increase to be unfair when it 
was the first price-change scenario they encountered. By contrast, between 16 percent to 41 
percent of respondents rated the same price increase to be unfair when they saw that scenario after 
they were first asked about a 333 percent price hike. 176 The benchmark effect remains directionally 
consistent across questions in Experiment 1 not pictured in Figure K. For example, while 
participants generally judge the 333 percent price increase as “unfair” or “very unfair,” they are 
more likely to say that a price increase of that magnitude is “very unfair” if they already have 
encountered the 33 percent price increase.177 This suggests that the 33 percent price increase is 
 
175 Of course, the benchmark would work in the opposite direction for participants who were first presented with 
the 33% increase. If they rated a 33% increase as “unfair,” they might, for consistency’s sake, feel obliged to rate 
a 333% increase as “very unfair.” 
176 The difference is statistically significant (p = 0.000 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). 
177 That said, the overall distributional distributions are only mildly different in the 333% case as one varies order 
of presentation (p = 0.241, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). 













also serving as a mild benchmark against which respondents evaluate (and condemn) the larger 
333 percent price increase. Judgments regarding the appropriate legal response track assessments 
of fairness. In the 33 percent price increase scenario, respondents are far less likely to favor a highly 
punitive response if they already have encountered the 333 percent scenario.178 And in the 333 
percent price increase scenario, respondents are mildly more likely to favor a punitive response if 
they already have encountered the more moderate price increase.179 
 
 At the same time, order effects appear to account for only a part—but not the entirety—
of the evident gap between our results and KK&T’s. Even when presented first with an exact 
replica of the KK&T snow shovel scenario as the initial price change vignette, only 62 percent of 
our respondents judged the $15-to-$20 price increase to be unfair, as compared with the 82 
percent for KK&T—a difference that remains economically and statistically significant.180  
 
Finally, note that the very existence of order effects also may bear on policy questions that 
are moored to fairness perceptions. If participants’ fairness perceptions can be manipulated by 
factors as trivial as question order, their views may not reflect deep and inveterate preferences 
about what sorts of price increases are (and are not) acceptable, but instead may ebb and flow in 
a manner that depends substantially on context. If fairness perceptions are so elastic that they can 
be shaped substantially by contextual presentation, then they are a dubious Archimedean point 
from which to guide our legal policy ship. It is to these normative questions that we now turn. 
 
IV.  Implications  
 
 Our results cast new light on the justifications for price gouging laws, the design and 
interpretation of price gouging statutes, and the social and behavioral sciences literature on 
consumer fairness. They also offer lessons to private-sector firms related to how they might 
approach price increases during shortages without inviting condemnation or customer backlash. 
We briefly address each in turn. 
 
A.  Justifications for Price Gouging Laws 
 
 As detailed in Part I, existing empirical work on consumer fairness perceptions has 
generated a folk wisdom that societal aversion to price increases can manifest relatively easily (e.g., 
with a price hike on the order of 33 percent during a shortage).181 This conventional wisdom, in 
turn, has buttressed and reaffirmed a variety of substantive choices about what magnitude of 
increase violates shared social norms, offends community standards, and triggers negative aesthetic 
externalities—each of which invites regulatory intervention. 
 
178 p = 0.000 (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). 
179 p = 0.788 (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). 
180 t = 10.32; p = 0.000. 
181 See Campbell et al., supra note 79; Frey & Pommerehne, supra note 95; Kahneman et al., supra note 11. 














 Our findings complicate this conventional wisdom, and in so doing they confound certain 
normative and prescriptive premises underlying price gouging laws. A majority of our 
participants—drawn from a large and nationally representative pool during an acute moment of 
scarcity—did not perceive markups on the order of 33 percent to be unfair.182 And, an even larger 
majority assessed the appropriate legal response to such price increases to be “nothing.”183 In some 
respects, our participants’ judgments were sensitive to changes in context, but in others they were 
strikingly stable. On one hand, the first price increase vignette encountered by a respondent 
appears to have established a benchmark against which she judged subsequent scenarios, 
suggesting that perceptions about price fairness are not set in stone, but are dependent upon 
contextual factors. On the other hand, participants treated other contextual differences—such as 
merchant vs. non-merchant and necessity vs. luxury good—remarkably consistently. 
 
The tolerance that our participants showed for significant price increases does not suggest 
that defenders of price gouging laws are without ammunition to defend their positions. Not all 
normative or prescriptive rationales against price gouging, after all, directly engage norms of 
fairness.184 And, even some aspects of our results lend heft to certain price gouging prohibitions. 
For example, our results do indicate that there is a strong and stable norm against extreme price 
increases (on the order of 333 percent), a result that is robust to different vignette details and largely 
transcends ideological lines. In addition, our results suggest that fairness norms may represent a 
weaker extra-legal constraint on price markups than heretofore commonly thought. Consequently, 
if one believed on independent grounds that crisis-induced price markups remain undesirable, our 
results potentially strengthen the argument that law “matters” (in the sense that legal mandates 
may be necessary for deterrence185). For all the benefits that social condemnation may have as a 
substitute for legal enforcement, our results suggest that its usefulness may be limited in this context. 
 
At the end of the day, then, our findings do not definitively resolve the price gouging debate 
so much as they inform and focus it. And this is unsurprising: only rarely does empirical evidence 
unambiguously resolve important policy debates unambiguously—especially those that implicate 
incommensurate value systems and worldviews (as does this one). That said, our results do lend 
important, evidence-based insights about whether and how price markups elicit social disapproval, 
and in this sense,  they inform the broader discussion about whether and how law might intervene. 
 
B. Design and Interpretation of Price Gouging Laws 
 
 
182 See Table E and accompanying discussion, supra. 
183 Id. 
184 For example, consumers’ bounded rationality or lack of information may raise policy concerns about price 
gouging particularly in the absence of social disapprobation. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53. 
185 Id. 













 Irrespective of one’s normative take on price gouging laws, the reality is that such bans are 
long-standing statutory authority in the majority of U.S. states. If we take some form of price 
gouging regulation as a given, how should those laws be crafted and understood? Our findings 
shed considerable light on those questions as well. 
 
1. Liability Triggers 
 
 As noted above, one of the decisions integral to the design of a price gouging statute is 
whether to embrace a quantitative-threshold rule or a squishy standard as the trigger for price 
gouging liability. Our results have implications for states that reach both decisions.  
 
For the quantitative-threshold states, our findings suggest that the triggers most of these 
states set—typically a 10- to 25-percent increase over the clear-day price186—are significantly lower 
than the level that generates consistent condemnation from survey participants. Indeed, over 50 
percent of our respondents considered a 33 percent increase over the pre-emergency price to be 
“completely fair” or “acceptable.” Under those circumstances, moreover, most respondents 
favored either no punishment or very light punishment (taking the item and paying the seller the 
pre-increase price). 
 
The evident misalignment between popular perceptions and legal prohibitions raises at 
least three problems for enforcement of price gouging laws in states with strict quantitative 
cutoffs.187 First, our findings indicate that policymakers may not be able to rely on extra-legal 
sanctions to reinforce statutory proscriptions. Second, while we did not test specifically for 
knowledge of the law, our results point to the possibility that modest price increases in an 
emergency may not be understood as illegal by many of the people to whom those laws apply. This 
realization is relevant to the level of notice that authorities will need to provide if they want to 
enforce the law as written. Most of us understand petty larceny to be a crime whether or not we 
know anything about our jurisdiction’s larceny laws. But if a state wants sellers to know that price 
increases on the order of 33 percent in an emergency are prohibited by law—and if it wants 
consumers to report such price increases to law enforcement—the state likely will need to take steps 
to spread that message. Finally, the mismatch between the law and norms raises challenges for 
prosecution: if the prescribed thresholds do not conform to jurors’ (or judges’) perceptions of 
inappropriate behavior, enforcers may even face the prospect of courtroom nullification, even after 
a technical violation of the rule.188  
 
186 See Appendix A. 
187 Our results arguably affirm the decisions of the quantitative-threshold regimes to frame their laws in relative 
rather than absolute terms (i.e., a 10 percent or 25 percent markup rather than a $10 or $25 increase). Our 
subjects in Experiment 1 reacted quite consistently to equivalent percentage increases, regardless of whether the 
starting price was low ($3) or high ($15). And moreover, this response appeared to persist across products.  
188 See Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial 
Jury, 1200-1800, 27-35 (1985) (describing the practice of English juries finding, contrary to the evidence, that 
the defendant had not broken a law that would have imposed a death sentence). 














For jurisdictions that embrace a standard-like threshold for their price gouging prohibitions 
(such as a “gross disparity” in price between the pre-emergency and emergency period),189 our 
findings suggest a separate set of challenges. Not only is price gouging “in the eye of the 
beholder,”190 but it turns out that different eyes hold very different views about what level of price 
hike should elicit normative objections, and those views are themselves highly influenced by price 
increases that individuals already have encountered. Enforcement is likely to be complicated by 
the fact that members of the public disagree rather dramatically about what sort of behavior ought 
to be proscribed. Even before the specter of courtroom nullification enters the picture, states with 
standard-like thresholds may encounter significant difficulty in delineating the content of their 
statutes amid widespread dissensus regarding the relevant behavioral norm. 
 
2. Statutory Reach 
 
As explained in Section I.B, jurisdictions differ in whether their price gouging laws apply 
only to necessities or to all goods, and only to merchants or to all sellers.191 In our reported results, 
participants tended not to make distinctions based on the nature of the good or the identity of the 
gouger. To the extent that participants drew any such distinction, it was with regard to the nature 
of the seller—and it was in a direction opposite of what might be predicted based on state statutes: 
Non-merchants who hoard and gouge elicited somewhat more intense disapprobation than 
merchants or businesses.  
 
The import of our results depends, again, on the normative theory that one brings to these 
questions. Policymakers may have reasons for treating necessary goods or merchants differently 
even if the general public doesn’t. At the very least, though, our results indicate that those states 
with “broad” price gouging laws that span many categories of goods do so in a manner that is 
consistent with our respondents’ view that the wrongfulness of price gouging does not depend on 
“necessity” status of the item in question. Similarly, those states that apply price gouging laws to 
all sellers do so in a manner that is consistent with generally shared views regarding the normative 
relevance (or more precisely, irrelevance) of the merchant/non-merchant distinction. And while 
our results cannot, on their own, justify reforms in jurisdictions with laws having a narrower scope, 
they nevertheless suggest that such jurisdictions are drawing a legal line where their citizens 





189 See Appendix A. 
190 See von Hoffman, supra note 24. 
191 See Appendix A. 













Price gouging laws are all over the map192 when it comes to the remedy or sanction for 
gouging, with large variations in the availability and size of civil and criminal penalties. In general, 
our participants’ responses reflect this variability. As we have noted, price increases that would 
trigger prima facie liability under many statutes are not even deemed wrongful by a majority of 
our participants, and, accordingly, they are not considered deserving of punishment. In addition, 
our respondents rarely advocated jail time, even for extreme gouging. This last point appears 
consistent with the actual legal response to the behaviors described in our vignettes.193  
 
That said, when our participants deemed conduct to be unfair, they were still disposed, 
nonetheless, to be somewhat punitive. For conditions with extreme price increases (333%), the 
modal subject response advocated a civil fine of $2,500. (And, as we observed in Part III, the 
attraction of stiff fines appeared to be particularly pronounced among non-conservative 
subjects.194) Overall, our participants seem to have higher thresholds for unfairness than many laws 
do, but once those thresholds are triggered, they appear willing to come down hard on violators. 
 
C. Implications for Social and Behavioral Sciences 
 
Our results also bear on the still-evolving understanding of fairness norms in the social and 
behavioral sciences. KK&T’s landmark study highlighted the power of empirical research to 
uncover fairness perceptions and shed light on their determinants. KK&T’s key findings, 
moreover, appear to have been generalizable across countries and continents at the time.195 But 
times—and norms—change. Setting aside the pandemic, a series of twenty-first century events––
such as the advent of online auction houses like eBay and the introduction of “surge” pricing for 
airline fares and shared rides––may well have acclimated consumers to the idea that prices can 
and often will move dynamically in response to demand shocks, thereby dampening social 
sensitivities to such fluctuations. The onset of the Covid-19 crisis—the chief motivator of this 
study—may have had an effect as well. Most Americans likely had not experienced widespread 
and persistent shortages of common household goods before March 2020. In the immediate 
aftermath of that experience, consumers may have become less satisfied with first-come-first-served 
as an allocation mechanism and more receptive to the use of price.  
 
The relative receptivity of respondents to price increases in our study raises doubts that 
fairness intuitions continue to exert a durable, first-order constraint on price adjustments.196 But 
these doubts, in turn, raise another question: If most consumers do not react especially negatively 
 
192 To underscore this point, we provide the reader with an actual state-by-state map in Appendix A. 
193 We are not aware of any active prosecutions for price gouging during Covid-19, but we suspect that 
imprisonment would only result from more systematic or egregious behavior than a simple price markup by an 
individual merchant. 
194 See, e.g., Tables 8 and 10, supra.  
195 See Frey & Pommerehene, supra note 95. 
196 Kahneman et al., supra note 11, at 738.  













to moderate price increases, why didn’t more stores increase prices of products in high demand 
during the late spring of 2020?197  
 
We suggest four potential explanations. First, we should note that a substantial minority of 
respondents still did consider price increases in the 33% range to be unfair (and a majority 
considered price increases of that magnitude to be unfair when it was the first price change vignette 
they encountered). It is possible the size of this group was sufficiently large to cause retailers to cater 
their price-setting behavior accordingly. A second possibility is that the “menu costs” associated 
with price changes remain prohibitive. Busy retailers may have lacked the time or inclination to 
change sticker prices rapidly. Yet dynamic pricing has become commonplace not only online, but 
also in brick and mortar stores,198 and even before the dynamic pricing revolution, prices were 
never set in stone. Frictions like menu costs may account for some of this behavior, but we are 
unconvinced such factors explain all (or even most) of it. 
 
A third possibility is that retailers are not aware of changes in consumer fairness perceptions 
over time. This, too, is difficult to rule out, though given the vast amount of energy and money 
that retailers devote to market research,199 it would be mildly surprising if three law professors, 
with the help of their superb research assistants, stumbled across a phenomenon that the firms 
themselves have not uncovered. If this really is the case, then the primary relevance of our findings 
may be for the marketing literature rather than the legal literature. We leave that for others to 
judge. 
 
Finally, and we think most plausibly, it could be that legal constraints (rather than fairness 
intuitions) conspire to prevent retailers from adopting dynamic pricing practices during 
emergencies. This possibility underscores our study’s practical significance. If state laws—and not 
consumer fairness perceptions—are what prevents the market from clearing in a shortage, then it 
becomes all the more important to understand and evaluate the performance of those laws in light 




197 See, e.g., How COVID-19 affected U.S. consumer prices in March, Reuters, Apr. 10, 2020 (documenting that most 
prices were stagnant or falling in March). That said, individual acts of gouging were well recognized. See, e.g., 
Kate Gibson, A $220 Bottle of Lysol? Coronavirus Leads to Price-gouging on Amazon, CBS News, Mar. 12, 2020.  
198 See, e.g., Sheng Li & Claire Chunying Xie, Automated Pricing Algorithms and Collusion: A Brave New World or Old 
Wine in New Bottles?, 18 Antitrust Source 1 (2018); Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 Stan. Tech. L. 
Rev. 128, 143 (2017); Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 100 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1323, 1327 (2016). 
199 Christine Moore and T. Austin Finch, Marketing Budgets Vary by Industry, Figures 1 & 2, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 
2017, https://deloitte.wsj.com/cmo/2017/01/24/who-has-the-biggest-marketing-budgets/ (quoting Deloitte 
Dev. LLP, The CMO Survey, Deloitte Dev. LLP, Sept. 26, 2016, https://deloitte.wsj.com/cmo/2016/09/26/the-
cmo-survey-top-trends-snapshot/?mod=Deloitte_cmo_relatedcontent).   














D. Implications for Business Strategy 
 
Our findings also have implications for sellers seeking to allocate scarce goods in an 
emergency. Perhaps most strikingly, our study suggests that consumers do not object to quantity 
limits. A whopping 97 percent of respondents considered a limit of one hand-sanitizer bottle per 
customer to be “completely fair” or “acceptable.” While Shiller et al. and Marcis et al. find 
evidence of opposition to government-imposed quantity restrictions, seller-imposed quantity 
restrictions on an item in high demand at the pandemic’s peak elicited few negative responses. In 
accordance with KK&T’s findings, though in tension with later studies, we found a very strong 
aversion to auctions, with 82 percent deeming hand sanitizer auctions to be unfair. For sellers 
concerned about their long-term reputations, our results suggest that the imposition of quantity 
limits carries relatively few risks and the use of auctions raises enormous ones. 
 
Our results also suggest that offering apologies and compelling explanations (particularly 
the latter) can go some distance in ameliorating consumers’ negative responses to sudden price 
increases at any level. This effect may not be particularly surprising, in light of the substantial 
literature that documents the efficacy of apologies in stemming legal exposure of health 
professionals; and a variety of states have amended their medical malpractice statutes to prohibit 
proffered apologies from being used later as admissions of culpability or negligence.200 But it does, 
again, point to a disconnect between consumer fairness perceptions and the law. With few 
exceptions, price gouging laws do not permit sellers to avoid or mitigate liability by tethering 
sudden price increases to apologies and/or sympathetic rationalizations. Indeed, we were unable 
to find any statute that addressed such expressions of remorse.201  
 
Of course, it might be possible to alter or amend price-gouging laws to accommodate 
apologies and rationales, such as by (say) mitigating sanctions or providing for affirmative defenses 
when price increases are chaperoned by contrition and explanation. But even short of legal or 
regulatory reform, our results still may hold helpful lessons for private ordering—particularly in 
states with no or only narrow price gouging statutes on the books. Vendors concerned about the 
reputational damage associated with price increases may well consider employing apologies and 
rationales effectively to assuage angry customers in the face of a sudden price increase. Indeed, as 
shown above, such measures substantially dampened the negative reactions of our participants, 
even in contexts where price increases were extreme.202 In this sense, our results contribute to a 
 
200 These jurisdictions include Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming; 
See Saitta & Hodge, Jr., supra note 100; Appendix A.   
201 See Appendix A. The closest thing to an exception here is that several states provide an exemption for price 
increases that are the direct result of a cost shock to the seller; but even here, no statute toggles liability based on 
whether this rationale (or any other one) is ever communicated to buyers. 
202 See text accompanying Table H, supra. 


















 In this article, we reported on results from a series of experiments related to price gouging 
and conducted at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. Our key findings both extend the academic 
literature around gouging and inform the design and potential reform of price gouging laws. 
Surprisingly, our participants were far more tolerant of relative price increases in ranges that 
existing literature predicts would meet stiff resistance, and that most price gouging statutes 
proscribe. Their attitudes, moreover, were relatively invariant to whether the good had a low or 
high pre-gouging price, whether the gouger was a merchant or an entrepreneurial resident, or 
whether the good was a Covid-19-related necessity or a non-necessity. By contrast, responses did 
vary substantially depending on the sequence of price changes presented: respondents who first 
encountered large price increases were more likely to deem moderate price increases to be fair, 
while respondents who had yet to see the large price were much more likely to condemn the 
moderate one. Finally, our results suggest that popular disapprobation of price gouging can be 
significantly dampened if the price increase is accompanied by a public-minded rationale (and even 
more so with an apology). Overall, these results highlight the contingent nature of fairness norms 
and the concomitant value of using replication and extension studies to understand the contours 
and triggers of such norms. Moreover, to the extent that market regulation and law depend on (or 
are constrained by) societal views about fairness, our results further underscore how important it is 
for legal designers to understand these nuances and to resist the temptation to overgeneralize 
context-specific insights when making trans-contextual policy. To do anything else would be both 
unwise and (for want of a better term) unfair. 
  
 
203 See, e.g., Dinah Wisenberg Brin, Handle with Care: Apologies Can Save Customer Relationships—Or Backfire, Forbes, 
July 14, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/dinahwisenberg/2019/07/14/handle-with-care-apologies-can-
save-customer-relationships-or-backfire/#2c80115359cd. 













Appendix A: A Survey of State Price Gouging Laws 
 
As of this writing, 37 states and the District of Columbia have explicit laws against price 
gouging in place, as pictured in the figure below. (Delaware’s law applies only to Covid-19 and a 
60-day recovery period afterwards. Of those with no laws specific to charging higher prices: (1) 
Alaska and Nevada allow consumers to file complaints against businesses suspected of price 
gouging to the Attorney General’s Office, who may pursue charges; (2) Maryland and Minnesota 
each have Executive Orders currently in effect for the length of each of their coronavirus 
emergency declarations that declare price gouging illegal; (3) Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, and New Mexico (the last of which promulgated a consumer advisory warning that 
price gouging during its Covid-19 emergency declaration would be enforced) have general 
consumer protection laws, which may penalize price gouging if it is found to be an unfair, 
unconscionable, or deceptive trade practice under the circumstances; and (4) Arizona, North 




The legal prohibitions on price gouging vary in several respects, including the factual 
setting to which they apply, the level of increase that triggers liability, the scope of goods covered, 
the actors to which the laws apply, and the sanction or remedy that follows liability. We summarize 
them briefly in turn. 
Factual setting triggering price gouging law 














● In most states, the price gouging law is triggered by an emergency declaration by the state 
Governor or US President. 
● Two states (Arkansas and Kentucky) specifically denote a code red from the Department 
of Homeland Security as a triggering event for the statute, indicating terrorism as a 
triggering concern for price gouging. 
● In several states, an “abnormal market disruption” is an alternative trigger, 
notwithstanding a lack of clear definition of the meaning of “abnormal market 
disruption”; that said, there is a wide consensus that a state of emergency also constitutes 
an abnormal market disruption. 
● Delaware’s new price gouging law pertains only to the Covid-19 pandemic and the state 
of emergency declared on March 12, 2020, and it expires on the sixty-first day following 
the termination of the state of emergency, unless modified.204 
 
Level of price increase that triggers liability 
● For states whose liability trigger is tied to a quantitative percent increase, most states are 
set to either 10% or 15% over pre-shortage levels, except for Alabama (whose trigger is 
25%).  
● For some states without sharp quantitative liability triggers, a percent increase of, say, 
20% (Pennsylvania) or 25% (Kansas) still constitutes prima facie evidence of an 
unconscionably excessive price in violation of the price gouging statute, but this appears 
to be a rebuttable presumption. 
● Relatedly, about half of state statutes contain an affirmative defense allowing the alleged 
violator to show that the price increases beyond its control (e.g. attributed to additional 
costs of doing business). 
● States vary regarding the “lookback” period for comparison in assessing the liability 
trigger: 
○ Some states compare the price during the time of emergency to prices 
immediately before to up to 90 days prior to the emergency. 
○ A few states do not define the basis and simply say “before” or “prior” to the 
emergency. 
○ One state (Idaho) also compares the price point to the price after the emergency. 
● The price gouging laws of some states (such as Michigan and Ohio) prohibit 
unconscionable acts or practices, including charging excessively high prices at all times, 
not just in times of emergency. 
 
Goods covered by price gouging law 
● Many state statutes apply specifically to “necessities”; and seven states specifically 
enumerate housing, lodging, and tenancy in their statutes, prohibiting landlords from 
terminating tenancy/evicting residents or charging excessive prices for housing and 
lodging. 
 
204 6 Del. Code § 2513A. 














● Most state statutes, however, do not confine their reach to enumerated goods/services, 
even those statutes that only cover “necessities.” 
 
Actors covered by price gouging law 
● About half of state statutes apply to anyone, while the other half target suppliers, 
merchants and three states (Illinois, Indiana, and Vermont) direct the statute only to fuel 
and/or petroleum-based goods or services. 
 
Sanctions/remedies 
● Most of the sanctions/penalties can be found in a state’s general unfair consumer 
protection statute. 
● Ten states allow for varying criminal sanctions, from misdemeanors to felonies depending 
on the extent of the violation: 
○ California goes a step further, and it is the only state where the price gouging 
statute is actually codified in the penal code. 
○ Tennessee, in contrast, specifically bars criminal actions. 
● About half of the states allow for civil injunctions. 
● Nineteen allow for restitution remedies. 
● Fifteen allow for individual remedies in private rights of action, while three states (Idaho, 
Maine, & Virginia) specifically bar individual remedies. 
● Civil fines vary greatly from state to state. Some states impose additional fines for taking 
advantage of senior citizens (generally defined as individuals 65 years of age or older). 
 
Those interested in a granular, state-by-state overview (including the District of Columbia and 
Puerto Rico) should consult the spreadsheet located at the following website:  
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Aj63xymNymrqvqZgw-
TB89Fnd64DnKAy/view?usp=sharing. 
Readers are welcome to utilize this worksheet for their own research. We ask only that they (a) 
agree to acknowledge this paper in any published work or working papers produced; and (b) alert 

















Appendix B: Statistical Robustness 
 
As noted in the text, the design of Experiment 2 allows us to exploit the “common 
questions” encountered by the participants to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the subject 
level using a “within subject” design. Although unobserved heterogeneity within participants is not 
always a cause for concern, particularly when the subject pool is large and participants are assigned 
randomly (both of which are true here), we nonetheless make use of these techniques below to 
confirm the robustness of our principal results. 
 
We note that within our survey protocols, panel data structure is also a bit of a curse, since 
the appropriate method for econometric estimation presents us with a different technical challenge. 
Recall that both of our dependent variables of interest (Unfairness assessment and Legal Response 
assessment) fall naturally on an ordinal scale; and thus, a standard ordered qualitative response 
model (such as an ordered logit used in the main text) would seem to be the appropriate approach. 
Yet, while ordered qualitative response models are well adapted for cross sectional analyses, they 
are known to be biased and inconsistent if one attempts to control for panel-like, “within subject” 
structure that our data exhibits.205  In contrast, linear models are better adapted for panel-like 
structures with fixed effects, but they require us to treat our dependent variable as effectively a 
continuous random variable on a cardinal scale (rather than a categorical response on an ordinal 
scale). Such an approach seems inappropriate too, since there is no guarantee that the hedonic 
“distance” between any two consecutive categories (such as “Completely Fair” and “Acceptable) 
is equal to that between any other two (such as “Acceptable” and “Unfair”).  
 
The technical issues flagged above are well known in the statistics and social sciences 
literature. Although multiple solutions have been proposed to address them, we are aware of two 
that seem to have gained some measure of acceptance: 
 
● A first strategy––known as the “blow-up and cluster” (or BUC) approach––retains the 
qualitative response structure of a logit/probit, but it estimates the ordered effects through 
a series of progressive, conditional dichotomous-choice models. Dichotomous-choice models do 
not suffer from the same maladies as ordered-choice models when it comes to accounting 
for unobserved heterogeneity within a panel, and they have been shown to deliver 
consistent estimates in such environments.206 The BUC approach exploits this property by 
effectively “amalgamating” an ordered choice analysis through a succession of 
dichotomous partitions. Explicitly, the BUC approach cycles through every possible binary 
dichotomization of the K ordered outcomes for the dependent variable (and K-1 associated 
 
205 Maximilian Riedl & Ingo Geishecker, Keep it simple: estimation strategies for ordered response models with fixed effects, 
41 J. of Applied Stat. 2358 (2014). 
206 See Gary Chamberlain, Analysis of covariance with qualitative data, 47 Rev. of Econ. Stud. 225 (1980). 













cutoff points), optimizing across them.207 Implementing this strategy involves cloning (or 
“blowing up”) each individual response into K-1 identical copies (one corresponding to 
each posited dichotomization) followed by a maximum likelihood estimation of the pooled 
dichotomous choice frames treating each cloned copy of the respondent as a different 
observation (with errors clustered at the cloned-respondent level).   
 
● A second strategy––often called Probit-Adapted OLS (or “POLS”)––manually re-scales the 
ordered outcome variables onto a “cardinal” score, assigning numerical values that 
correspond to each category’s overall observed frequency in the data parameterized against 
a posited background distribution (usually the standard normal). The rescaled variables 
could then be reconceived as a more authentic discretization along the intensive margin of 
a latent variable that is itself continuous, thereby facilitating least-squares estimation (with 
or without fixed respondent effects), and a natural interpretation of coefficients as reflecting 
“standard-deviation units” of the dependent variable.208 
 
In our assessment of the literature, there appears to be no consensus ranking among the 
two strategies outlined above. For the sake of completeness, then, we chose to implement both 
methods. The tables below present regression results from Experiment 2 for both Unfairness and 
Legal Response assessments, along three different perspectives. First, in Table A1 we present the 
coefficients of a BUC estimator for Unfairness (left panel) and Legal Response (right panel), in a 
fashion similar to Tables 8 and 9 from the text. Second, in Tables A2–A3 we present OLS estimates 
(without fixed effects) of Unfairness and Legal Response answers (respectively) after re-scaling both 
dependent variables against a standard normal distribution, per the POLS approach. Finally, in 
Table A4 we implement POLS with fixed effects at the respondent level for both Unfairness 
assessments (left panel) and Legal Response assessments (right panel).  
 
Our results prove to be exceedingly robust to introducing within-subject controls. For 
example, virtually every coefficient estimate Table A1 is within a tenth of a standard error of its 
corresponding coefficient in Tables 8 and 9. A similar relationship holds if one compares the 
coefficients of Table A4 to Tables A2 and A3. Consequently, even after attempting to control for 






207 See Gregori Baetschmann, Kevin E. Staub & Rainer Winkelmann, Consistent estimation of the fixed effects ordered 
logit model, 178 J. R. Stat. Soc. A. 685 (2015); Bhramar Mukherjee, Jaeil Ahn, Ivy Liu, Paul J. Rathouz & Brisa 
N. Sanchez, Fitting stratified proportional odds models by amalgamating conditional likelihoods, 27 Stat. Med. 4950 (2008). 
208 Bernard van Praag & Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Happiness Quantified: A Satisfaction Calculus Approach 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) (proposing this approach originally); see also Riedl & Geishecker, supra note 205.  
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